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CRISIS COMPOUNDED BY CONSTRAINT: HOW REGULATORY 
INADEQUACIES IMPAIRED THE FED’S BAILOUT OF BEAR STEARNS 
BRYAN J. ORTICELLI 
 
This Note explores the failure of the investment bank Bear Stearns 
within the context of the greater financial crisis that began in the summer 
of 2007, largely as a result of the widespread collapse of the market for 
subprime mortgage-backed securities.  Specifically, this Note discusses in 
detail the circumstances surrounding the fall of Bear Stearns, the 
unprecedented measures taken by the Federal Reserve to avoid a 
disorderly breakup of the firm, and the policy implications of the Fed’s 
actions for the future of investment bank regulation.  By devoting 
particular attention to the Fed’s response to Bear Stearns’s liquidity crisis, 
which peaked in March of 2008, this Note seeks to elaborate on the 
statutory provisions utilized by the Fed in the “unusual and exigent” 
situation presented by the Bear Stearns predicament.  Moreover, drawing 
on criticisms voiced by members of both the public and private sectors 
regarding the inadequacies of the Fed’s regulatory resources during the 
Bear Stearns crash, this Note considers potential reforms to federal 
supervision of investment banks in the future.  With the hope of better 
understanding the government’s role in the ongoing financial dilemma, 
this Note uses the Bear Stearns bailout as a template for increasing 








 NOTE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 649 
II.  THE TRAGEDY OF BEAR STEARNS ................................................ 653 
A.  THE OPENING ACT: JULY 2007–FEBRUARY 2008 ............................... 653 
B.  THE PERFECT STORM: MARCH 2008 ................................................... 655 
C.  THE TIME OF RECKONING.................................................................... 658 
D.  SHOTGUN MARRIAGE MADE IN HEAVEN ............................................ 661 
III.  AN “UNUSUAL AND EXIGENT” LENDER OF LAST RESORT .... 664 
A.  TOO BIG TO FAIL ................................................................................. 664 
B.  SWEETENING THE DEAL ...................................................................... 668 
C.  THE OFFSPRING OF EMERGENCY ......................................................... 672 
IV.  INADEQUACIES IMPAIRING INTERVENTION ............................. 675 
A.  THE CALL FOR REGULATORY REFORM ............................................... 675 
B.  PRIVATE SKEPTICISM........................................................................... 679 
V.  GOING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT BANK 
REGULATION ..................................................................................... 682 
A.  AN ATTEMPT AT RECONCILIATION ...................................................... 682 
B.  THE CURRENT REALITY ...................................................................... 689 














CRISIS COMPOUNDED BY CONSTRAINT: HOW REGULATORY 
INADEQUACIES IMPAIRED THE FED’S BAILOUT OF BEAR STEARNS 
BRYAN J. ORTICELLI* 
As we continue to address current market stress, we must also examine 
the appropriate policy responses.1 
 
In other words, the regulation that we have didn’t work very well.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Long before American taxpayers became the proud owners of up to 
$700 billion in Wall Street’s “toxic assets,”3 Uncle Sam was already taking 
novel actions to rescue failing financial giants from their own balance 
sheets.4  More specifically, in March 2008, nearly seven months prior to 
“one of the largest-ever government interventions in the nation’s 
economy,”5 the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) exercised emergency lending 
authority to prevent an imminent failure of the investment bank, Bear 
Stearns.6  In so doing, the Fed utilized a “Depression-era law”7 in its role 
                                                                                                                          
* Nova Southeastern University, Farquhar College of Arts & Sciences, B.S. 2007; University of 
Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010.  I would like to express my sincere gratitude to 
Professor Patricia McCoy for her guidance and inspiration of this Note.  This Note is dedicated to my 
parents for their unwavering support throughout my life.  All errors contained herein are mine and mine 
alone. 
1 Henry M. Paulson, Fmr. Sec’y of the Treasury, Remarks to the National Press Club on 
Recommendations from the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Mar. 13, 2008), 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp872.htm. 
2 Tyler Cowen, Too Few Regulations?  No, Just Ineffective Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at 
B7. 
3 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 115(a)(3) (2008) 
(authorizing the Treasury to incur up to $700 billion in purchase costs of troubled mortgage-backed 
securities and other assets). 
4 See Michael Crittenden & Marshall Eckblad, Update: Fed Rescue of Bear Stearns Isn’t Like 
Bailouts of Old, DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Mar. 14, 2008 (“When the Fed announced . . . it had 
arranged short-term emergency financing for [Bear Stearns]—an unprecedented event, depending on 
whom you ask—it sent a signal to the world’s investors that a failure at [Bear Stearns] could put 
markets around the world at risk.”); see also David Fettig, The History of a Powerful Paragraph, 
REGION, June 2008, at 33, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/08-06/section13.pdf 
(“When describing the Federal Reserve’s response to the Bear Stearns episode, observers have used 
words like ‘extraordinary’ and ‘unprecedented.’”). 
5 Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 4, 2008, at A1. 
6 See Timothy F. Geithner, Fmr. President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Testimony Before the 
U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (Apr. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/gei080403.html (explaining the necessity of 
Fed intervention in the Bear Stearns financial crisis); Kate Kelly et al., Fed Races to Rescue Bear 
Stearns in Bid to Steady Financial System—Storied Firm Sees Stock Plunge 47%; JP Morgan Steps In, 
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as “lender of last resort”8 to avert the economic catastrophe that a 
disorderly bankruptcy of Bear Stearns presented.9  Fearful of the systemic 
risk posed by a sudden failure of an institution as large and interconnected 
as Bear Stearns, proponents of the bailout justified its imposition given the 
“unusual and exigent circumstances” involved.10  Moreover, with no 
private sector solution readily apparent at the time, the Central Bank had 
few options to choose from to protect the nation’s economy—a process 
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke argued was “severely complicated by the lack 
of a clear statutory framework for dealing with such a situation.”11 
The arcane framework criticized by Chairman Bernanke consists of 
fragmented authority among a variety of agencies including, among others, 
the Fed, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), who all play a role in 
overseeing investment banks.12  Not surprisingly, this consortium of 
                                                                                                                          
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2008, at A1 (“Credit turmoil spread to the heart of the U.S. financial system as 
Bear Stearns Cos., an 85-year-old institution that has survived the Depression and two world wars, 
sought and received emergency funding backed by the federal government.”).  For a more detailed 
discussion of the Fed’s utilization of emergency lending authority during the Bear Stearns crisis, see 
infra Part III.A.–B.  It should be noted at the outset that this Note’s continuous reference to “Bear 
Stearns” is made with respect to the company as the nation’s fifth-largest investment bank as it existed 
in March 2008.  Benton Ives, Fed Dips into Bag of Liquidity Tricks, CQ WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 2008, at 
684.  Although The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. included numerous subsidiary institutions and 
organizations, this Note is solely concerned with the operations of Bear Stearns as an investment bank.  
Investment banks (i.e., nonbanks), unlike their commercial depository counterparts, function primarily 
as financial intermediaries, and are subject to less regulatory oversight and standards than traditional 
banks.  See, e.g., Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit 
Market 10 (Fla. Int’l Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1141955 (“Nonbank lenders need not comply with federal limits on how much 
the lender can leverage [or assume debt] itself.” (citation omitted)). 
7 Greg Ip, Bear on the Brink: Desperate Fed Dusts Off Remedy from the Depression to Save 
Bear—Opening the Discount Window for a Nonbank Requires Special Votes at Central Bank, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 15, 2008, at A9. 
8 David Fettig, Lender of More than Last Resort, REGION, Dec. 2002, at 15–19, 44–47, available 
at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf. 
9 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Forum on Mortgage Lending for Low and Moderate Income 
Households (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke 
20080708a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, FDIC] (“[A]llowing Bear Stearns to fail so abruptly at a time 
when the financial markets were already under considerable stress would likely have had extremely 
adverse implications for the financial system and for the broader economy.”). 
10 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony 
Before the Joint Economics Committee (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080402a.htm (“With financial conditions fragile, the sudden failure 
of Bear Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in [critical] markets and 
could have severely shaken confidence.”); see also Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
11 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium (Aug. 22, 2008), available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080822a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, Kansas 
City]. 
12 See Regulatory Checks and Balances, CQ WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 2008, at 681, 681 (“A variety of 
federal agencies oversee the nation’s financial institutions.  In response to the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets has proposed that many of those regulators 
step up their oversight, particularly in regards to trading in mortgage-backed securities.”). 
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government entities can result in gray areas of regulation, where seemingly 
distinct oversight duties can overlap and lead to supervisory inconsistency, 
or worse.13  For example, although Bear Stearns was primarily regulated by 
the SEC as a securities firm, the Commission (unlike the Fed) does not 
“have a checkbook to help inject money into an investment bank or market 
when it hits trouble.”14  Conversely, during the Bear Stearns emergency, 
the Fed lacked the extensive regulatory oversight of investment banks that 
the SEC’s mandate provides15—oversight which may have preemptively 
thwarted the need for an eventual $29 billion bailout.16 
Concerns such as these have prompted intense review by members of 
both the public and private sectors of existing financial regulation, 
particularly as coordinated and implemented by the Fed over investment 
banks.17  With immense changes to government policy already occurring,18 
                                                                                                                          
13 See Kara Scannell, The Bear Stearns Fallout: Crisis Highlights SEC’s Limits—Agency’s Lack 
of Tools to Stem Financial Woes May Rekindle Debate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A19 (“These 
various [agencies] are all doing the same thing even if they’re called different things.  It doesn’t allow 
for the effective measurement of risk, the effective development of national policy.  It’s just a 
patchwork quilt that needs to be revised.” (quoting Harvey Pitt, former SEC Chairman)). 
14 Id.; see also Kara Scannell, Credit Crisis: SEC Comes Under Criticism in Light of Bear Woes, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A6 (discussing the SEC’s limitations in times of financial crisis). 
15 See Roger C. Altman, How the Fed Can Fix the World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at A25 
(“[S]uddenly, the Fed was standing behind both the larger [commercial] banks it regulates and the 
major investment banks it does not.  This cannot continue.”).  Despite the SEC’s broad ideological 
regulatory mission, its efforts in actively overseeing diverse financial operations, including those of 
hedge funds, have been the subject of ongoing scholarly criticism.  See Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin 
Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of 
Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 48–60 (2007) (evaluating historical limitations on 
the SEC’s oversight of hedge funds). 
16 See Amit R. Paley & David Hilzenrath, SEC Chief Defends His Restraint; Cox Rebuffs 
Criticism of Leadership During Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2008, at A1 (“The March collapse of 
Bear Stearns illustrated an array of [SEC] shortcomings, according to a review by the SEC’s inspector 
general.  [The inspector general] concluded that [SEC] officials had been aware of ‘numerous potential 
red flags’ at Bear Stearns ‘but did not take actions to limit these risk factors.’”); see also Kate Kelly, 
The Fall of Bear Stearns: Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days—Paulson 
Pushed Low-Ball Bid, Relented, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1 (“To make [Bear’s bailout] 
palatable to the Fed, J.P. Morgan assumed responsibility for the first $1 billion of any potential losses, 
reducing the government’s exposure [in the bailout] to $29 billion.”). 
17 See, e.g., Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Financial Regulation in a System Context, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2008, at 2, 2–13, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2008_fall_bpea_papers/
2008_fall_bpea_morris_shin.pdf (“The most pressing policy question has been whether broker-dealers, 
[including investment banks] should fall under banking regulation overseen by the Federal Reserve, 
and if so how they should be regulated.”); see also Elizabeth F. Browne, The Tyranny of the Multitude 
Is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. 
Competitiveness?, 2 BROOKINGS J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369, 376–410 (2008) (criticizing the 
American financial regulatory structure as detrimental to global competition and providing empirical 
analysis of derogatory effects within various financial markets); Ashok Vir Bhatia, New Landscape, 
New Challenges: Structural Change and Regulation in the U.S. Financial Sector 17–19 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. 07/195, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1007943 (discussing emerging policy considerations in the changing U.S. financial 
markets). 
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questions remain as to the proper scope of the Fed’s administrative 
authority19—especially now that the financial landscape has altered such 
that no major independent investment banks exist.20  As the Bear Stearns 
incident suggests, effective government oversight directives can mean the 
difference between preventing a crisis and using billions of dollars of 
public funds to bail out private enterprises.21  However, as former Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson has noted, regulation cannot “go so far as to . . . 
make our markets less efficient,”22 or less competitive by stemming 
innovation.23 
Using the Bear Stearns case as a template, this Note explores the 
criticisms regarding the regulatory structure of the American financial 
industry with the goal of increasing dialogue as to the proper role of 
government in the free market.  By focusing on the unique circumstances 
precipitating government action in avoiding the collapse of Bear Stearns, 
this Note analyzes the legal tools relied on by the Fed to rescue Bear, and 
how these tools may have been inadequate for the task at hand.  Finally, 
this Note draws on existing scholarly work to evaluate models of reform as 
the economy continues to evolve. 
Part II chronologically traces the factual developments leading up to 
and including the Fed’s bailout of Bear Stearns.  Discussion centers on the 
early onset of the subprime mortgage crisis, initial effects of the crisis on 
Bear Stearns’s ability to do business, and how Bear’s exposure to exotic 
mortgage products eventually induced its demise.  Part II also examines the 
near bankruptcy of Bear and the Fed’s actions in forestalling this 
occurrence, including facilitating the acquisition of Bear Stearns by 
JPMorgan Chase (“JPMorgan”). 
Part III considers the legal authority (pursuant to the Federal Reserve 
Act) justifying the Fed’s actions in providing emergency funding to Bear 
                                                                                                                          
18 See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 2008, at A1 (“The S.E.C.’s oversight responsibilities will largely shift to the Federal Reserve, 
though the commission will continue to oversee the brokerage units of investment banks.”). 
19 See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“Going forward, a critical question for regulators 
and supervisors is what their appropriate ‘field of vision’ should be.”). 
20 See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to 
Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at A1 (“It had become increasingly clear to Fed 
officials . . . that the investment-banking model couldn’t function in these markets.”). 
21 See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“The regulation and supervisory oversight of 
financial institutions is another critical tool for limiting systemic risk. . . . A stronger [regulatory] 
infrastructure would help to reduce systemic risk.”). 
22 Paulson, supra note 1. 
23 See Browne, supra note 17, at 376–410 (suggesting that disorganized government policy can 
negatively affect the United States’ ability to compete for foreign investors in a variety of markets); 
John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct Regulatory 
Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1371, 1423 (2008) (“An 
increasingly heavy regulatory burden and a complex, cumbersome regulatory structure with overlaps at 
the state and national levels is causing an increasing number of businesses to conduct more and more 
transactions outside the country.” (citation omitted)). 
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Stearns and arranging JPMorgan’s purchase of the company.  Additionally, 
Part III assesses the creation and revision of lending facilities operated by 
the Fed following the Bear Stearns experience and how these facilities 
contribute to the growing supervisory authority of the Central Bank. 
Part IV analyzes criticism as to both the Fed’s apparently inadequate 
ability to effectively manage the Bear Stearns situation and concerns that 
have been voiced regarding the increasing omnipresence of government in 
the free market.  To bolster the contextual perspective of these competing 
positions, comparisons will be drawn from diverse regulatory systems, 
including those operative in foreign arenas, particularly the United 
Kingdom. 
Finally, Part V focuses on the principal issue of systemic risk in 
evaluating the future of investment bank regulation, and how current 
research on the topic may contribute to a new regulatory framework better 
equipped at protecting the American (and global) economy.  Part V also 
reviews the state of the current financial markets in considering the need 
for added regulation, while reflecting on the causes and implications of the 
ongoing financial debacle. 
II.  THE TRAGEDY OF BEAR STEARNS 
A.  The Opening Act: July 2007–February 200824 
Prior to the summer of 2007, “the world experienced an unusual mix of 
financial conditions”25 that resulted in a dramatic growth of a variety of 
consumer and financial markets, most notably the housing market and 
subprime mortgage loan industry.26  Large investment banks sought to 
capitalize on the boom in the housing market by not only buying 
                                                                                                                          
24 This subpart is intended to provide necessary background leading up to the Fed’s bailout of 
Bear Stearns in March 2008.  As such, brief consideration is paid to the onset of the subprime mortgage 
crisis and the ensuing credit crisis within the financial markets, and how this phenomenon contributed 
to Bear Stearns’ operational failure.  However, full discussion of the causes and implications of the 
mortgage and credit crises is beyond the scope of this Note. 
25 Timothy F. Geithner, Fmr. President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Council on 
Foreign Relations Corporate Conference 2008: The Current Financial Challenges: Policy and 
Regulatory Implications (Mar. 6, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/ 
2008/gei080306.html [hereinafter Geithner, Foreign Relations]. 
26 See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social 
Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 282–300 (2008) (providing a detailed account of the 
growth and eventual collapse of the subprime mortgage market); see also A. Mechele Dickerson, 
Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 139–44 (2008) (describing 
the increase in mortgage lending and consumer debt assumption and noting how such factors 
contributed to the onset of the mortgage crisis); Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007–2008: A 
Discussion of the Background, Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. 
LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 2008, at 531, 536, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/ 
review/08/09/Mizen.pdf (“The market for subprime mortgages grew very fast.”). 
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considerable stakes in subprime mortgage loans,27 but also by 
“securitizing” and pooling these loans into structured assets that would be 
attractive to other investors based on anticipated return and risk exposure.28  
These assets, known primarily as subprime mortgage-backed securities 
(“MBS”) and collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”),29 were particularly 
popular with two large hedge funds at Bear Stearns: the “High-Grade 
Structured Credit Strategies Fund” and the “High-Grade Structured Credit 
Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund.”30 
Despite their initial appeal, subprime MBS and CDOs turned toxic 
when the housing bubble burst starting in late 2006 and early 2007, and 
extending into 2008.31  Large losses from these investments quickly 
resulted in the evaporation of financing for private-label MBS,32 causing 
loss of investor confidence and the subsequent failure of many subprime 
lenders.33  As these problems continued to escalate in a vicious cycle 
                                                                                                                          
27 See Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past, Present, and Future, 12 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 125, 130 (2008) (“[N]ever before had those on Wall Street been invested so heavily in 
securities backed by subprime loans. . . . [T]hese investment vehicles became highly sought after by . . . 
investment banks.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Rescue Me: A Fed Bailout Crosses a Line, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2008, at B1 (“As of . . . Nov. 30, [2007,] Bear Stearns had on its books approximately $46 
billion of mortgages [and] mortgaged-backed . . . securities.”). 
28 See LUIGI SPAVENTA, CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH, POLICY INSIGHT NO. 22, AVOIDING 
DISORDERLY DELEVERAGING 1 (2008), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/ 
PolicyInsight22.pdf (“[B]anks would pool and securitize the [products] they originated to distribute 
them and transfer their risks to a myriad of investors.”). 
29 See Johnston et al., supra note 27, at 128–29 (discussing CDOs and MBS as types of 
investments that derive their value from the repayment of loans by the initial home borrowers).  To 
make these investments marketable, investment firms would splice original loans into “tranches” to 
reduce the risk of loss presented by a loan’s default.  Id.  Thus, investors could largely choose the type 
of risk they were willing to accept based on the yield values of differing tranches.  See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 373, 375–79 (2008) (detailing the distribution of CDOs and MBS through unique schematic 
processes). 
30 These funds held “60% of their net worth . . . in exotic securities.”  Matthew Goldstein & David 
Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, BUS. WK., Oct. 22, 2007, at 50; see also Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds at 
Bear Stearns Face Shutdown—As Rescue Plan Falters amid Subprime Woes, Merrill Asserts Claims, 
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A1 (“[T]he two Bear Stearns hedge funds held more than $20 billion of 
investments, mostly in complex securities made up of bonds backed by subprime mortgages . . . .”). 
31 See Joe Nicer & Edmund L. Andrews, Running a Step Behind as a Crisis Raged, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2008, at A1 (“The subprime mortgage debacle began emerging in the summer of 2007 . . . [b]ut 
the true depth and extent of the losses did not become clear until [early in 2008] . . . .”); John Tatom, 
The U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: A Two-Pronged Assault on the U.S. Economy 4–14 (Munich  Personal 
Repel Archive, Paper No. 9787, 2008), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9787/1/MPRA_ 
paper_9787.pdf (explaining how declines in the demand for housing and slowing in home appreciation 
contributed to losses in mortgaged related investments). 
32 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the Joint 
Econ. Comm. (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/ 
bernanke20080924a.htm (“[F]alling home prices and rising mortgage delinquencies have led to major 
losses at many financial institutions, losses only partially replaced by the raising of new capital.”). 
33 See Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech to the Money 
Marketeers of New York University: Outlook and Risks for the U.S. Economy (Sept. 10, 2007), 
available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20070910a.htm (“The rise in 
delinquencies in the subprime market has led to the collapse of some large subprime lenders and 
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throughout late 2007 and early 2008, consequences soon spread to Wall 
Street and Bear Stearns, which in the summer of 2007 attempted to save 
one of its hedge funds by injecting $1.6 billion into its reserves—
ultimately to no avail as both funds eventually lost all value.34 
“By various accounts, the funds’ meltdown signaled the start of a 
collapse in the vital element of trust that must exist between a firm like 
Bear and its many customers.”35  This breakdown in trust would abruptly 
evolve into a contagion, attacking the heart of Bear Stearns’s business 
operations and bringing the eighty-five-year-old institution to its knees.36  
For the fourth quarter of 2007, Bear reported a $2 billion write down in 
mortgage securities,37 and posted its “first-ever quarterly loss” of $859 
million.38  Unfortunately for the company, such losses would be 
emblematic of Bear’s remaining existence as a going concern.  Throughout 
the rest of 2007 and into early 2008, Bear saw its stock value plummet, 
client trust evaporate, and cohesion among its leadership unwind.39 
B.  The Perfect Storm: March 2008 
To understand how Bear Stearns ultimately collapsed, it is first 
important to explain Bear’s financing structure.  As an investment bank,40 
Bear relied on short-term (usually overnight) loans called repurchase 
agreements (“repos”) to finance its daily activities and liquidity demands.41  
                                                                                                                          
inflicted substantial losses on holders of subprime [MBS] and of some . . . CDOs. . . . These 
developments have contributed materially to the drop in demand for housing [in 2007].”). 
34 See GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS AND “RESCUE” FOR A 
MAJOR PROVIDER OF MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS 2, Mar. 19, 2008, available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34420_20080319.pdf (noting that soon after Bear’s loans to these 
funds, “the funds lost all of their value and were allowed to wind down”). 
35 Id.; see also Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A1 (“The demise of the hedge funds began a slow but persistent loss of 
market confidence in the bank . . . . Such erosion can be devastating for any investment bank, 
especially one like Bear Stearns . . . .”). 
36 See SHORTER, supra note 34, at 2 (noting that the initial breakdown in trust among Bear’s 
customers would lead to unprecedented moves by the company to survive). 
37 David Smith & Dominic Rushe, The Banking Twister Heading Your Way, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Mar. 16, 2008, at B4 (“A month [after Bear attempted to save one of its hedge funds,] the 
firm announced that the game was up for the funds, which had effectively lost all their value . . . .”). 
38 SHORTER, supra note 34, at 2. 
39 See Kate Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear 
Stearns—Executives Bickered Over Raising Cash, Cutting Mortgages, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at 
A1 (documenting internal developments at Bear Stearns following the failure of its hedge funds in the 
summer of 2007 through January 2008). 
40 Unlike commercial banks, investment banks do not take deposits from traditional individual 
customers; rather, “[a]n investment bank’s activities” consist  of “(1) managing an investment portfolio 
. . . and (2) operating as a central market maker and counterparty” in financial markets.  Dwight Jaffee 
& Mark Perlow, Investment Banking Regulation After Bear Stearns, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Sept. 2008, 
at 1, 1–2. 
41 See Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, in INSTRUMENTS 
OF THE MONEY MARKETS 59, 60 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. Laroche eds., 1993) (“[Repurchase] 
agreements usually are arranged with short terms to maturity—overnight or a few days.”); Stephen G. 
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Repos are secured by collateral (including MBS) that the borrowing 
institution promises to buy back at a specified date and at a specified price, 
“which typically includes interest at an agreed upon rate.”42  In essence, 
because repos were vital to Bear’s daily operations, they left Bear at the 
mercy of lender sentiment.43  Thus, when the subprime mortgage crisis 
unfolded, lenders grew more fearful of entering into collateralized loans 
with Bear given the firm’s large exposure to mortgage products.44  Instead, 
lenders hoarded their liquidity, uncertain about the health of their own 
balance sheets and those of their counterparties.45  “And it was the 
[eventual] refusal of Bear’s repo lenders to extend overnight loans that 
confirmed that Bear had a liquidity crisis [in mid-March 2008].”46 
However, the growing failure of Bear to secure its vital repos in March 
2008 was not the only factor that led to the firm’s “liquidity crisis.”47  
While it may be said that Bear’s repo problems kept it from pulling money 
in, Bear’s exposure to a variety of deteriorating assets led to losses that 
eroded its already meager capital.48 
For example, Bear, like other investment banks, initially appealed to 
investor concerns of security by selling a type of insurance product along 
                                                                                                                          
Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, at 10 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 14134, 2008), available at, http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w14134.pdf (“Large financial institutions that hold various types of assets use repos to finance 
their short-term liquidity needs—and those needs have grown astronomically.”).  Amazingly, Bear 
Stearns borrowed “more than 30 times the value of its $11 billion equity base,” amounting to a 
“leverage ratio of over 30 to 1.”  Thomas, supra note 35.  To make matters more complicated, Bear 
used large amounts of this borrowed money to invest in the same CDOs it was selling to other 
investors.  See Kelly et al., supra note 30 (“The problems can be exacerbated because many hedge 
funds invest in CDOs with the help of borrowed money.  To buy a triple-A rated CDO note for $1,000, 
it is common for a hedge fund to put down only $100 of its own money . . . .”). 
42 See Lumpkin, supra note 41, at 59, 62. 
43 See Gabilondo, supra note 6, at 19 (“It was lender sentiment [in the repo market] that [Bear’s] 
managers considered when evaluating the severity of the firm’s liquidity crisis.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
44 See id. (“Anxious about market conditions, these lenders preferred to hoard liquidity rather than 
to enter into collateralized loans.”).  This phenomenon was symptomatic of the larger financial crisis in 
which banks grew so fearful of lending to one another that access to available credit became very 
difficult to secure.  See Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 12 (“[T]he overriding consideration in the refusal of 
banks to lend to one another must have become the concern over credit risk—that is, the risk that 
borrowers would fail to repay.”). 
45 See Randall S. Kroszner, Governor of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Risk 
Management Association Annual Risk Management Conference: Strategic Risk Management in an 
Interconnected World (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
kroszner20081020a.htm (“Uncertainty about the value of assets and other exposures, as well as 
uncertainty about the ability of institutions to sustain continued access to funding, has caused financial 
institutions to operate with great caution and hoard funds.”). 
46 Gabilondo, supra note 6, at 19. 
47 Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and Columbia Business School Conference on the Role of Money Markets (May 
29, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20080529a.htm. 
48 See Geithner, supra note 6 (“The rumors of Bear’s failing financial health caused its balance of 
unencumbered liquidity . . . to decline sharply . . . .”). 
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with the MBS and CDOs Bear promoted.49  Known as credit default swaps 
(“CDS”), these insurance contracts were marketed to investors as an 
effective way to hedge risks associated with the default of underlying 
mortgage loans.50  Essentially, CDS enabled investors in CDOs or MBS to 
protect themselves in the event the underlying investment defaulted, by 
paying a periodic fee in exchange for the promised contingency payment.51  
Furthermore, even those investors who had not bought mortgaged-related 
products could purchase CDS as a type of side bet that loans would default 
and the investor would be paid the value of the CDS coverage.52  CDS 
created systemic risk because the same investment banks that were selling 
these contracts were also buying them from other financial guarantors to 
secure the CDS they had sold.53  Because the CDS market was largely 
unregulated,54 the aggregate amounts of these contracts skyrocketed to an 
estimated total amount of $60 trillion,55 with Bear Stearns alone holding 
roughly “$14.2 trillion of notional value in derivative contracts [including 
CDS] outstanding with thousands of counterparties.”56 
Ultimately, as mortgage loans defaulted in vast numbers, Bear’s CDS 
liability was triggered.  But there was one problem: “there was no money 
                                                                                                                          
49 See SHORTER, supra note 34, at 4. 
50 See 60 Minutes: A Look at Wall Street’s Shadow Market (CBS television broadcast Oct. 5, 
2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/05/60minutes/main4502454.shtml (“A 
[CDS] was available [to investors], marketed to them as a risk-saving device for buying a risky 
financial instrument.” (quoting Michael Greenberger, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Maryland)); see also 
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1019, 1021 (2007) (“[A] credit default swap is a private contract in which private parties bet on a debt 
issuer’s bankruptcy, default, or restructuring.”).  As credit derivatives, CDS derive their value from an 
underlying “price, rate, index, or financial instrument,” such as a MBS or CDO.  David Mangle, Credit 
Derivatives: An Overview, ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 1, available at http://www.frbatlanta. 
org/filelegacydocs/erq407_mengle.pdf. 
51 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Systemic Risk and Regulation 4–5 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 95-24, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=787797 (describing CDS arrangements). 
52 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 50, at 1022 (“Like other derivatives, credit default swaps can 
be used not only for hedging, but also for speculation or arbitrage.”); 60 Minutes: Financial Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (CBS Television broadcast Oct. 26, 2008), available at  http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2008/10/26/60minutes/main4546199.shtml?tag=currentVideoInfo;segmentUtilities (“[CDS] 
were essentially private insurance contracts that paid off if the investment went bad.  But you didn’t 
have to actually own the investment to collect on the insurance.”). 
53 See Geithner, Foreign Relations, supra note 25 (“[O]n the assets they retained, these same 
institutions purchased insurance from financial guarantors and other firms that were exposed to the 
same risks.”). 
54 See 60 Minutes, supra note 50 (discussing how CDS regulation had been lacking since 2000).  
Following the stock market crash of 1907, state laws across the country made betting arrangements 
(such as those embodied by CDS) a felony.  Id.  However, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000 effectively removed the restrictions placed on these transactions.  Id.; see also Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 27f(c) (2006) (preempting state regulation of CDS 
transactions whose initial manifestation occurred in gambling houses known as “bucket shops”). 
55 Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, with No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 
2008, at A1. 
56 Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 17.  This figure is not totally comprised of CDS, as the firm also 
held other types of derivative products, including futures and options.  Id. 
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behind the commitments.”57  The same institutions that had sold CDS were 
not legally required to set aside the necessary cash to cover “their potential 
losses.”58  Together with the defection of its hedge fund customers who 
could easily withdraw their large deposits,59 the CDS losses suffered by 
Bear helped set the stage for a classic run on the (investment) bank.60  
Amid growing market anxiety, key counterparties began canceling their 
investment and brokerage accounts with Bear,61 with “[s]ome [investors] 
pulling their cash . . . for fear it could get locked up if there was a 
bankruptcy.”62  As clients withdrew their business, Bear watched as its 
credit dissolved, and it was only a matter of time before Bear’s problems 
became a public concern.63 
C.  The Time of Reckoning 
Bear’s access to and drain of liquidity continued to develop in early 
2008.  On March 10, “rumors began to circulate in the market that there 
were significant liquidity problems at Bear Stearns itself.”64  These rumors 
were then exacerbated by attempts to quell them, as Bear executives and 
Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) both issued statements aimed at 
reassuring investors that Bear was in good health, emphasizing the firm’s 
large cash holdings of approximately $18 billion.65  Nonetheless, such 
actions could not stop the intensifying “exit by counterparties” Bear was 
                                                                                                                          
57 60 Minutes, supra note 50.  More precisely, CDS are traded as over-the-counter (“OTC”) 
derivatives without strict regulatory oversight, and as such “contracts can be traded—or swapped—
from investor to investor without anyone overseeing the trades to ensure the buyer has the resources to 
cover the losses if the security defaults.”  Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, 
TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html. 
58 60 Minutes, supra note 50. 
59 See Morris & Shin, supra note 17, at 15. 
60 See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“The collapse of Bear Stearns was triggered by a 
run of its creditors and customers, analogous to the run of depositors on a commercial bank.”). 
61 See Kate Kelly, SEC Will Scour Bear Trading Data—Documents Reveal Who Was Exiting 
Deals in Final Days, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at A1 (describing how several important investment 
institutions sought to cancel their business connections with Bear in anticipation of the firm’s collapse).  
The exit by counterparties actually increased market stress, as these parties struggled to find substitute 
transaction avenues.  See Serena Ng, Crisis on Wall Street: Credit-Default Market Freezes as Risk 
Grows, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at C3 (discussing how this phenomenon negatively affected 
greater market confidence). 
62 Kelly et al., supra note 6. 
63 See Kate Kelly et al., In Dealing with Bear Stearns, Wall Street Plays Guardedly, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 13, 2008, at C1 (“Bear’s fundamental issue isn’t liquidity or capital as much as the erosion of its 
business model as a result of the credit crunch.”). 
64 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 27, (Apr. 28, 2008), 
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/692396293x0xS1193125-08-92860/777001/ 
filing.pdf. 
65 See id. (“Moody’s clarified that . . . Bear Stearns’ . . . current ratings outlook was stable 
[and] . . . Bear Stearns issued a press release denying the market rumors regarding its liquidity 
position.”); Ruddy Boyd & Doris Burke, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2008, at 
86. 
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experiencing.66  And “a number of U.S.-based fixed-income and stock 
traders that had been actively involved with Bear . . . had reportedly 
decided by March 10 to halt such involvement.”67 
On Tuesday, March 11, investors continued to grow anxious over the 
rumors, and ING Group NV, “a major asset-management company,” 
stopped doing trades with Bear68—it was clear that “[c]redit was drying 
up.”69  Again, in an effort to calm market fears, Bear Stearns executives 
decided that President and CEO Alan Schwartz should address the public 
live from a media conference in West Palm Beach, Florida.70  Mr. 
Schwartz did so the next morning, appearing on CNBC and stating that 
“we don’t see any pressure on our liquidity, let alone a liquidity crisis.”71  
Meanwhile, “prime-brokerage clients continued to pull their money” from 
Bear,72 “causing senior management . . . to become concerned that if these 
circumstances accelerated Bear Stearns’s liquidity could be negatively 
affected.”73  When Mr. Schwartz arrived back in New York late 
Wednesday, March 12, he assembled “senior executives to discuss how to 
save the firm.”74  But, his efforts would prove fruitless. 
By Thursday, March 13, “market speculation had swelled” regarding 
Bear’s access to credit and “[a]round 4:30 p.m., Mr. Schwartz was 
convinced that Bear was facing a desperate situation.”75  Confronted with 
the ongoing demands of clients and lenders to withdraw their money from 
Bear, the firm had seen its liquidity reserves depleted to nearly $2 billion, a 
loss of approximately $15 billion in four days.76  Frantic to find a solution, 
Mr. Schwartz contacted Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, in a bid 
to negotiate a deal with the company, which had a long transactional 
history with Bear Stearns.77  Mr. Dimon agreed to help, dispatching senior 
                                                                                                                          
66 See Kelly et al., supra note 6 (explaining the swift departure of customers that had previously 
been willing to trade with Bear). 
67 SHORTER, supra note 34, at 3. 
68 Id. 
69 Boyd & Burke, supra note 65. 
70 See Kelly et al., supra note 6. 
71 Interview by David Faber with Alan Schwartz, President & CEO, Bear Stearns, on CNBC: 
First on CNBC (CNBC television broadcast Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://video.nytimes.com/ 
video/2008/03/14/business/1194817092072/bear-chief-firm-was-on-solid-ground.html. 
72 Kate Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns, 
WALL ST. J., May, 28, 2008, at A1. 
73 JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 64, at 27. 
74 Kelly, supra note 72. 
75 William Sluis et al., Bailout of Wall Street Firm Shocks Markets; Federal Reserve Forced to 
Save Company Squeezed by Mortgage Securities, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 2008, at C1. 
76 See Robin Sidel et al., The Week that Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear Stearns, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1 (“By [Thursday], Bear Stearns’s cash position had dwindled to just 
$2 billion.”). 
77 See Kelly, supra note 72 (describing how Schwartz contacted Dimon during his birthday party 
and related to Dimon “[l]et’s do something”); see also Mizen, supra note 26, at 549 (noting that 
JPMorgan Chase served effectively as Bear Stearns’s “banker”). 
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JPMorgan traders to Bear to review the firm’s financial position.78  Upon 
review, “[Dimon’s] group appeared stunned,”79 and it became apparent 
later in the evening that Bear would not be able to secure unassisted private 
financing from JPMorgan or any another institution.80  Bear’s directors 
approved an emergency bankruptcy filing, and the firm’s corporate 
counsel, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, began drafting necessary 
documentation.81  Representatives from the SEC and the New York Fed, 
which had been closely monitoring the situation, participated in a 
conference call with members of the Board of Governors of the Fed and 
the Treasury Department to discuss the implications of a Bear 
bankruptcy.82  Chaotic discussions continued throughout the evening and 
into the early morning, but no clear resolution was in sight.83 
At 5 a.m. on Friday, March 14, Timothy Geithner (then-President and 
CEO of the New York Fed) convened a conference call “with top 
government officials” to rule on the fate of Bear Stearns.84  Recognizing 
Bear’s highly complex interrelationships with thousands of counterparties, 
and fearing that a failure of Bear could touch off a domino effect among 
other institutions in similar market positions,85 “the Federal Reserve, in 
close consultation with the Treasury Department, agreed to provide 
funding to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase.”86 
Because Bear Stearns was an investment bank, it could not use its 
collateral to gain a direct loan from the Fed’s “discount window,”87 
necessitating the utilization of emergency lending authority.88  Although 
technically the Fed did not lend directly to Bear, by providing the funds to 
JPMorgan to then re-issue to the firm, the Fed itself assumed the risk of the 
                                                                                                                          
78 See Kelly, supra note 72; see also JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 28 (“Representatives of 
JPMorgan Chase and officials from the U.S. Treasury Department, the New York Fed and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System engaged in discussions regarding how to resolve the liquidity 
deterioration at Bear Stearns.”). 
79 Kelly, supra note 72. 
80 See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 28. 
81 Kelly, supra note 72. 
82 See Geithner, supra note 6. 
83 See Sidel et al., supra note 76 (“‘It was a traumatic experience,’ says one person who 
participated.  Sleep deprivation set in, with some of the hundreds of attorneys and bankers sleeping 
only a few hours . . . .”). 
84 Kelly, supra note 72. 
85 For example, “Bear risked defaulting on extensive ‘repo’ loans . . . . If that happened, other 
securities dealers would see access to repo loans become more restrictive[,]” not to mention the fear 
that would be set off in the CDS markets.  Kelly et al., supra note 6. 
86 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080403a.htm. 
87 For purposes of this Note, the discount window is best understood as a lending mechanism 
which helps the central bank “ensure the basic stability of the payment system . . . by supplying 
liquidity during times of systemic stress.”  The Federal Reserve Discount Window, 
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43#introduction (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2009). 
88 See Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 17. 
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loan.89  “By any measure, this action was extraordinary,” as the New York 
Fed provided Bear with approximately $12.9 billion, a move not seen since 
the Great Depression.90  The twenty-eight day government guarantee was 
greeted with “high-fives” and cheers among Bear executives, who believed 
that the term of the loan would allow them enough time to find a private 
buyer for their firm.91  To the contrary, news of the loan was not nearly as 
welcomed by Bear’s counterparties, or the market as a whole, as Friday 
saw Bear’s common stock close down forty-seven percent, and the major 
ratings agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) drastically 
downgraded Bear’s long- and short-term credit ratings.92  Based on these 
developments, then-Secretary Paulson realized the loan was not a viable 
solution and contacted Mr. Schwartz that same evening,93 informing the 
CEO that the Fed-backed liquidity “would not be available on Monday 
morning.”94  Suddenly, twenty-eight days became two, as Paulson told 
Schwartz “[he] need[ed] to have a deal by Sunday night.”95  With most of 
Bear’s customers and clients abandoning ship, there seemed to be only one 
likely suitor: JPMorgan. 
D.  Shotgun Marriage Made in Heaven 
Saturday morning, March 15, Mr. Schwartz together with senior 
management of Bear Stearns met with their counterparts at JPMorgan and 
J.C. Flowers & Co. (“JCFlowers”) to discuss the potential for mergers or 
acquisitions.96  Throughout the day and into the evening, Bear’s leadership 
attempted to negotiate a realistic proposal that could be finalized by late 
Sunday evening before the open of Asian and European markets.97  At the 
same time, Bear’s legal team again began to analyze potential bankruptcy 
and/or liquidation scenarios, mindful of the limited protections available to 
the firm under the United States Bankruptcy Code, as well as the 
approaching Sunday deadline.98 
Negotiations continued into early Sunday morning, March 16.  
However, it soon became apparent that a purely private sector solution 
would not be possible.  JPMorgan reported that “it would need some level 
of financial support from the New York Fed” to undertake a Bear Stearns 
                                                                                                                          
89 See Kelly et al., supra note 6. 
90 Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 17. 
91 See Sluis et al., supra note 75. 
92 JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 28. 
93 See Kelly, supra note 16. 
94 JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 29. 
95 Kelly, supra note 16. 
96 JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 29. 
97 See Kelly, supra note 16 (providing detailed documentation of the negotiations as they 
unfolded on March 15). 
98 See id. (noting that Bear’s status as a broker would present serious limitations and risks in any 
type of bankruptcy filing). 
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acquisition, and JCFlowers was having difficulty finding institutions to 
finance any type of transaction with Bear Stearns.99  As such, officials 
from the New York Fed were advised of the situation and “indicated that 
[they] would be willing to consider the possibility of an arrangement that 
would result in the New York Fed assuming some of the risk associated 
with” a JPMorgan takeover.100  Initially, the Fed agreed to provide $30 
billion of “non-recourse funding”101 to JPMorgan secured by collateral 
consisting mainly of risky MBS and other assets that Bear owned.102  This 
liquidity infusion would enable JPMorgan to acquire Bear and immediately 
guarantee its outstanding debts to remaining counterparties and 
customers—a vital factor in returning trust to the shaken global markets.103 
Armed with this taxpayer-based guarantee, JPMorgan approached 
Bear’s board of directors with a finalized stock merger agreement in which 
Bear’s common stock would be exchanged for JPMorgan common stock 
for $2 per share (the “original offer”).104  As a company that had a per-
share value of approximately $171 in January 2007,105 the original offer 
did not sit well with Bear’s board, which voiced its disagreement and 
worried that acceptance would constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty to 
stockholders.106  Nevertheless, the fear of imminent bankruptcy coupled 
with the fact that no other solution was feasible (and increased pressure 
from the government) led to an endorsement by Bear’s board of the 
original offer, with the transaction announced in a joint press release 
Sunday evening.107 
Before the original offer could be presented to Bear’s shareholders for 
                                                                                                                          
99 JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 30. 
100 Id. at 31. 
101 A non-recourse loan is one in which the Fed would not be able to raise a legal claim against 
JPMorgan in the event the loan was not repaid and the Fed lost money.  See MARC LABONTE, CONG. 
RES. SERV., FINANCIAL TURMOIL: FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY RESPONSES 7 (2008), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34427_20080407.pdf. 
102 See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 31. 
103 See id. (“[B]ased on the New York Fed’s willingness to provide the $30 billion special funding 
facility, JPMorgan Chase thought that it would be able to work towards negotiating a stock-for-stock 
merger with Bear Stearns . . . with the need to guaranty certain obligations . . . effective immediately.”). 
104 Id. 
105 See Madlen Read & Joe Bel Bruno, Bear Stearns Shareholders OK Buyout by JPMorgan, 
USA TODAY, May 29, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-05-29-3197519795_ 
x.htm. 
106 See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 31–32 (“Bear Stearns registered its objections to [the original 
offer and] . . . [r]epresentatives of Bear Stearns’ legal advisors reviewed the fiduciary duties of the 
board of directors, including the duties of directors if a company is insolvent or approaching 
insolvency.”).  Following the eventual endorsement of the merger, numerous “class action lawsuits 
[were] filed against Bear Stearns, its board of directors and certain of Bear Stearns’ present and former 
executive officers” alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty.  Id. at 48–49. 
107 See id. at 33 (“[T]he Bear Stearns board of directors unanimously approved the agreement . . . .  
Later that evening, JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns issued a joint press release announcing the 
transaction.”); see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The Short, Happy Death of Bear, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 
2008, at A14 (“[The Fed] had plenty of legitimate clout, which it apparently used to virtually dictate the 
original $2 share price.”). 
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approval, “perceived deficiencies” and market reaction concerning the 
merger’s closure would necessitate amendments.108  With the immediate 
concern of bankruptcy pacified, Bear Stearns and JPMorgan executives 
met throughout the week of March 17 to discuss merger revisions that 
would be more acceptable to Bear’s shareholders and market 
speculation.109  By week’s end, no revised agreement had been reached, 
and for a third time Bear’s legal team met to discuss the possibility that the 
firm would have to file for bankruptcy on Monday, March 24.110  Anxiety 
increased among Bear’s creditors that the merger would fall through given 
the low offer proposed, with tense negotiations occurring back and forth 
between Bear’s and JPMorgan’s legal offices.111  “At one point, J.P. 
Morgan threatened to pull financing . . . [and Bear’s] directors talked 
briefly about suing J.P. Morgan[,] . . . [b]ut they quickly realized their 
position was untenable.”112  Finally, by Monday, March 24, the parties 
reached a provisional agreement to amend the original offer.113  Most 
importantly, the new merger agreement appealed to investors and market 
confidence by increasing the stock transfer rate from $2 to $10, and 
obligated JPMorgan to assume the first $1 billion in losses as deducted 
from the $30 billion guarantee to be provided by the New York Fed.114 
For many, a crisis had been averted, but at what cost?115  By pledging 
$29 billion of hard-earned taxpayer money through its discount window to 
an investment bank foiled by bad decisions,116 the Fed’s actions set a 
                                                                                                                          
108 See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 33 (describing how market reactions to the original offer 
prompted JPMorgan and Bear executives to enter into revised transaction negotiations). 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at 34 (“[I]f the New York Fed and JPMorgan Chase were unwilling to maintain their 
funding of Bear Stearns . . . [Bear] would not be able to open for business on Monday . . . .”). 
111 See id. (“[R]epresentatives of Bear Stearns contacted JPMorgan Chase’s counsel . . . to notify 
JPMorgan Chase that its proposal, as presently formulated, was not acceptable to the Bear Stearns 
board . . . .”). 
112 Kelly, supra note 16. 
113 See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 34–35. 
114 See id. at 35–36 (outlining the terms of the new merger agreement).  “This means that if the 
value of the assets [accepted by the Fed] turn out to be less than $29 billion, the [Fed] would suffer a 
loss.”  Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 18.  Since the time the Fed accepted these assets as collateral for the 
loan to October of 2008, taxpayers lost approximately $2.2 billion dollars, based on the ongoing 
deterioration of mortgage values.  Editorial, The Fed Takes a Writedown, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2008, at 
A16. 
115 Given the ongoing corrosion of key markets, the total loss that will be suffered by taxpayers as 
a result of the Bear Stearns bailout remains to be seen.  “[I]n October, six months after taking on $29 
billion from investment bank Bear Stearns’ loan portfolio, the Fed decided to write down $2 billion of 
the holdings.”  Jon Hilsenrath, Bernanke’s Fed, Echoing FDR, Pursues Ideas and Action, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 15, 2008, at A2. 
116 See Jenkins, supra note 107 (“Opening up its loan window to investment banks, and through 
them to their hedge fund clients, [the Fed] has alleviated the fear of fire sales of mortgage assets.”).  
For an interesting historical account of the creation and use of the Fed’s discount window, see Anna J. 
Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window (Apr. 9, 1992), in FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. 
LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 1992, at 60–63, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/ 
92/09/Misuse_Sep_Oct1992.pdf. 
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precedent that risky investors who were “too big to fail” would be saved 
from their own self-perpetuated demise.117  Soon after the bailout, critics 
denigrated the Fed’s actions as uncharacteristic of a capitalist society,118 
while others used the event as a catalyst to launch attacks against the 
broader financial regulatory system.119  Now that the Fed is willing to use 
its resources to save private investment firms whose bankruptcy could 
harm the entire economy, what new types of regulation should such 
businesses be subject to?  “As the Bear Stearns episode illustrates, some of 
the modern-day financial institutions that are too big to fail are not 
depository institutions that fall under the strict regulatory umbrella that 
accompanies membership in the Federal Reserve System.”120  The 
remainder of this Note analyzes the legal authority available to the Fed 
during the Bear Stearns collapse, why this authority has been criticized as 
deficient, and how scholarly review of twenty-first century financial threats 
may lead to the revision and modification of twentieth-century financial 
regulation. 
III.  AN “UNUSUAL AND EXIGENT” LENDER OF LAST RESORT 
A.  Too Big to Fail 
“Legally, the Fed can extend virtually unlimited support to our 
financial system,”121 and since the 1930s the Fed has had the authority to 
issue direct loans to private businesses through its discount window.122  
Nonetheless, before the Bear Stearns predicament, the Fed traditionally 
reserved discount window loans for those institutions that were subject to 
the Fed’s strict supervisory protocol, namely, heavily regulated depository 
                                                                                                                          
117 Crittenden & Eckblad, supra note 4; see also LABONTE, supra note 101, at 12 (“Institutions 
that are too big to fail are ones that are deemed to be big enough that their failure could create systemic 
risk, the risk that the financial system as a whole would cease to function smoothly.”).  The problem of 
encouraging risky behavior by bailing out failing institutions is commonly referred to as “moral 
hazard.”  See id. at 11. 
118 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, We’re Not Headed for a Depression, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2008, at 
A27 (“The ‘too big to fail’ approach to banks and other companies should be abandoned as new long-
term financial policies are developed.  Such an approach is inconsistent with a free-market economy.”). 
119 See, e.g., Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (criticizing the regulatory framework of the 
American financial system as inefficient for being ambiguous in its legal mandates); see also William 
Neikirk et al., Call Grows for Tough Financial Regulation; Candidates, Congress Consider 
Intervening in Banking, Markets, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2008, at C1 (“Political fervor is growing for a 
broad re-regulation of America’s financial markets after a major credit crunch pummeled Wall Street 
and Main Street, sent the economy sinking and threatened a market meltdown.”). 
120 LABONTE, supra note 101, at 12. 
121 Altman, supra note 15. 
122 See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 3–4 (discussing the use of the Fed’s discount window in the 
past).  The statutory authority for the Fed’s discount window lending is provided for in section 10(b) of 
the Federal Reserve Act, which provides that “[a]ny Federal Reserve bank . . . may make advances to 
any member bank on its time or demand notes having maturities of not more than four months and 
which are secured to the satisfaction of such Federal Reserve bank.”  Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 
347b(a) (2006). 
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institutions.123  In essence, “[i]n exchange for putting up with regulation 
from the Fed and requirements over how much capital they can hold, 
[commercial] banks have access to the ‘discount window,’ at which they 
can borrow emergency cash in exchange for sound collateral.”124  
However, despite its seemingly limitless potential to rescue ailing 
businesses, the discount window has long been a secondary tool of the Fed 
in altering market operations,125 and even those firms which could access 
the Fed’s window in the past have rarely done so for a couple of reasons.  
First, from the government’s perspective, the Fed has likely been hesitant 
to issue loans because each time it does so a precedent is established that 
compounds moral hazard, or the tendency of market participants to engage 
in risky behavior irrespective of the consequences given the potential for a 
public rescue.126  Second, when a private enterprise looks to the Fed’s 
discount window for a loan, it usually means the government is the last 
resort for the company, which in turn demonstrates weakness to the greater 
market.127  Thus, as a corollary of both government and private reluctance, 
rarely would one see the full extent of the Fed’s lending power in action.128 
But, what happens when one business’s failure threatens the larger 
economy the Fed is obligated to protect, as Bear Stearns’s bankruptcy did?  
Similarly, how can the Fed respond to a systemic threat from an institution 
not subject to its “regulatory regime?”  The answer to these questions lies 
in a little known provision of the Federal Reserve Act.  In such 
circumstances, the Fed can call on emergency lending authority to protect 
the larger financial system, and in doing so provide liquidity to any 
                                                                                                                          
123 See Greg Ip et al., Stronger Steps: Fed Offers Banks Loans to Ease Credit Crisis, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 18, 2007, at A1 (“[T]he discount window’s reach in the current crisis is limited by the fact that 
only [commercial] banks can use it, and they aren’t the ones facing the greatest stains.  Rather the 
strains are being felt by nonbanks . . . .”). 
124 Neil Irwin, Fed Leaders Ponder an Expanded Mission; Wall Street Bailout Could Forever 
Alter Role of Central Bank, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2008, at A01. 
125 See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 4 (“The Fed’s main policy tool shifted from the discount 
window to open market operations several decades ago.”). 
126 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference: Liquidity Provision by the Federal 
Reserve (May 13, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20080513.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, Atlanta I].  Chairman Bernanke stated: 
A central bank that is too quick to act as liquidity provider of last resort risks 
inducing moral hazard; specifically, if market participants come to believe that the 
Federal Reserve or other central banks will take such measures whenever financial 
stress develops, financial institutions and their creditors would have less incentive to 
pursue suitable strategies for managing liquidity risk and more incentive to take such 
risks. 
Id.; see also Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad Loans Win: 
When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 
737, 752–54 (2008) (explaining moral hazard in the context of the mortgage crisis). 
127 See Ip et al., supra note 123 (“[The discount window] is little used because it generally carries 
a stigma, since it is seen as a struggling bank’s last resort.”). 
128 Cf. Nelson D. Schwartz,  A History of Public Aid During Crises, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at 
A27 (noting government’s past intervention in the private market during periods of financial crisis). 
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institution, not just those within its regulatory reach.129  It is this emergency 
authority that gives credence to the Fed’s characterization as “lender of last 
resort.”130  And it is precisely this use of the Fed’s emergency authority to 
rescue Bear Stearns that has incited reconsideration of the Fed’s regulation 
of investment banks—the argument being that if firms can get public 
money, they should be subject to heightened public oversight by the 
agency lending that money.131 
The specific legal provision authorizing emergency lending to private 
enterprises is section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.132  That section 
provides in pertinent part: 
3.  Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations. 
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Federal Reserve 
Board, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, 
may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods 
as the said board may determine, . . . to discount for any 
individual, partnership or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills 
of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange 
are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the 
Federal Reserve bank.133 
                                                                                                                          
129 See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 1 (“Lending to non-members requires emergency statutory 
authority that has not been used in more than 70 years.” (citation omitted)). 
130 Id. at 2; see also Frederic S. Mishkin, Gov. of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the 
Caesarea Forum of the Israel Democracy Institute: Global Financial Turmoil and the World Economy 
(July 2, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080702a.htm 
(“[I]t is critical that the Federal Reserve acts as lender of last resort when financial stability is 
threatened . . . .”). 
131 See, e.g., Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s Credit Market Symposium (Apr. 17, 2008), available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20080417a.htm (“[I]n my view greater regulatory 
attention will need to be devoted to the liquidity risk-management policies and practices of major 
investment banks.”). 
132 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
133 Id. § 343 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, in Bear’s case, “[t]he required number of five 
members of the Board of Governors was not present on the day in question.  One of them was out of 
town and ratified the vote when he returned, but the first loan was already in motion.”  Walker F. Todd, 
The Bear Stearns Rescue and Emergency Credit for Investment Banks, AIER, Aug. 11, 2008, 
http://www.aier.org/research/commentaries/445-the-bear-stearns-rescue-and-emergency-credit-for-
invesmtn-banks.  The legal authority allowing for votes of less than five members of the Board of 
Governors is provided for by section 11(r)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(IV) of the Federal Reserve Act, which 
mandates: 
A.  Any action that the Board is otherwise authorized to take under Section 13(3) 
may be taken upon the unanimous vote of all available members then in office, if: 
I.  unusual and exigent circumstances exist and the borrower is unable to 
secure adequate credit accommodations from other sources; 
II.  action on the matter is necessary to prevent, correct, or mitigate serious 
harm to the economy or the stability of the financial system of the United 
States; 
III.  despite the use of all means available (including all available telephonic, 
telegraphic, and other electronic means), the other members of the Board 
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Originally enacted in 1932, the law was an outgrowth of the bank 
failures of the early twentieth century and has been used in different 
contexts over its seventy-seven-year history, albeit never in the same 
manner as in the Bear Stearns case.134  Aside from the requirement that five 
governors vote to approve a loan under section 13(3), the provision has 
few limitations in terms of the amount that can be lent, or the means by 
which the Fed can do so.  The condition that collateral be offered “to the 
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank,” is contingent upon a plethora of 
extrinsic considerations (including systemic risk) that at times may seem 
inconsistent.135  For example, some have criticized the Fed for accepting 
the collateral pledged by Bear Stearns or American International Group 
(“AIG”) under section 13(3),136 while Lehman Bros. (“Lehman”) was 
allowed to go into bankruptcy.137  Also, discount window lending is 
usually secured through collateral possessing a good credit rating, which 
was certainly not the case in the loans made to Bear Stearns.138  
                                                                                                                          
have not been able to be contacted on the matter; and 
IV.  action on the matter is required before the number of Board members 
otherwise required to vote on the matter can be contacted through any 
available means (including all available telephonic, telegraphic, and other 
electronic means) . . . . 
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 248(r) (2006); see also Minutes of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 2–3 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/other/other20080627a1.pdf (documenting the Board’s vote with regard to factors 
specified by section 11(r)(2)(A)(ii)). 
134 See Fettig, supra note 8, at 15–19, 44–47 (describing the historical evolution of section 13(3)); 
Fettig, supra note 4, at 34 (providing a concise timeline of the development of section 13(3) from 1932 
to present). 
135 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
136 See Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm (“The Federal Reserve Board . . . authorized the Federal 
Reserve bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to [AIG] under section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act.”). 
137 See Adam Shell et al., No White Knight Emerges to Rescue Lehman Bros., USA TODAY, Sept. 
15, 2008, at 1B (“The failure to get a Lehman deal was due largely to the federal government’s refusal 
to provide interested buyers such as Barclays with the kind of support that JPMorgan Chase received 
when it bought troubled investment bank Bear Stearns in March.”); Sale Possible as Lehman Sits on 
Brink, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2008, at C1 (“Compounding anxiety is that Lehman, unlike smaller rival 
Bear Stearns, might not be able to count on a lifeline from the government.”). 
138 Technically, Federal Reserve Banks may only provide advances and discounts to individual 
institutions when such extensions of credit are “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve 
bank.”  Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 343, 347b(a) (2006).  For purposes of discount window 
lending, the collateral being pledged by borrowers must “meet regulatory standards for sound asset 
quality,” meaning that assets held by solvent, yet illiquid institutions, will generally be adequate to 
meet the satisfaction standard of the Federal Reserve Act.  Federal Reserve Discount Window, 
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/cfaq.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=89 (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2009).  However, although MBS and SMBS are nominally acceptable as discount 
window collateral, it is hard to see how the toxicity of Bear’s MBS assets would satisfy Federal Bank 
officials, especially when one considers the state of Bear’s financial health during the Fed rescue.  See 
Federal Reserve Discount Window General Information, http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/ 
discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43#introduction (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (noting that 
“[t]he financial condition of an institution may be considered” when evaluating whether, and to what 
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Nonetheless, section 13(3) was used three times by the Fed in March 2008, 
initially as a means of preventing Bear Stearns’s imminent default and 
arranging the JPMorgan acquisition, and subsequently to create a new 
lending facility specifically for the large institutions the Fed conducts daily 
transactions with.139 
Interestingly, it is this last use that demonstrates the Fed’s challenges 
in responding to emergency situations of a systemic nature.  For if the only 
means by which the Fed can save institutions—by issuing direct loans—is 
the same mechanism scorned by the market as a sign of weakness, troubled 
institutions may hesitate to use the discount window during a financial 
crisis.140  Thus, to counteract the stigma associated with the discount 
window, the Fed created new lending mechanisms—including the Term 
Auction Facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, and the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility—in anticipation of the need for heightened 
borrowing, which has since reached astronomical levels.141  Given this 
deficiency, “Fed officials believe[] the [current economic] problems 
require[] more than what a central bank was designed to do—provide 
emergency loans to healthy institutions in tumultuous times.”142  And yet, 
stretching the Fed’s loan capacity was not the only uncharacteristic action 
taken by the Fed in the Bear Stearns case—an even more controversial 
move was the manner in which the Fed brokered the JPMorgan takeover. 
B.  Sweetening the Deal143 
As previously noted, when the Fed issued the $29 billion loan pursuant 
to section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to arrange for JPMorgan’s 
acquisition of Bear Stearns, the funds were first filtered to JPMorgan  then 
                                                                                                                          
extent, a Federal Reserve bank will issue extensions of credit through the discount window).  Of 
course, this issue adds to the controversial nature of the Bear Stearns bailout. 
139 See Bernanke, Atlanta I,  supra note 126 (detailing use of the Fed’s emergency lending 
authority in each circumstance). 
140 See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 4–5 (“Ironically, this means that although the Fed 
encourages discount window borrowing so that banks can avoid liquidity problems, banks are hesitant 
to turn to the Fed because of fears that doing so would spark a crisis of confidence.”). 
141 See Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 19–20 (noting that as of May 2008, the Fed had nearly $180 
billion worth of loans as compared to a total of $190 million only nine months earlier).  There is some 
indication that borrowing and lending from the Fed by both commercial and investment banks has 
decreased early in 2009—this could be the result of investor pressures seeking bank independence 
without government support.  See Prabha Natarajan & Brian Blackstone, Mortgage-Bond Purchases 
Start Strong—Fed’s Various Efforts to Bolster Markets Are Ballooning Its Balance Sheet, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 9, 2009, at C3 (“Borrowing through the Fed’s discount window by commercial banks . . . fell 
about $10 billion [in the first week of January, while] [l]ending through the Fed’s [PDCF] . . . fell [$3 
billion] . . . .”). 
142 Jon Hilsenrath et al., Crisis Mode: Paulson, Bernanke Strained for Consensus in Bailout, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, at A1 (emphasis added). 
143 This section focuses primarily on the Fed’s use of emergency lending authority and other legal 
tools to arrange the eventual takeover of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan.  As such, the discussion focuses 
on the legal authority involved in the merger, not other contexts. 
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used to secure Bear’s debts and take over Bear’s operations.144  Aside from 
exercising emergency authority to distribute the loan in the first place, the 
Fed also had to exempt JPMorgan from another provision of the Federal 
Reserve Act, which is designed to prohibit the very type of transaction the 
Bear Stearns deal involved.145  The provision in question is section 23A of 
the Federal Reserve Act, which provides: 
Restrictions on Transactions with Affiliates 
1.  A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in a 
covered transaction with an affiliate only if: 
A.  in the case of any affiliate, the aggregate amount 
of covered transactions of the member bank and its 
subsidiaries will not exceed 10 per centum of the 
capital stock and surplus of the member bank; and 
B.  in the case of all affiliates, the aggregate amount 
of covered transactions of the member bank and its 
subsidiaries will not exceed 20 per centum of the 
capital stock and surplus of the member bank.146 
Section 23A is designed to limit the extent of covered transactions, 
including loans, extensions of credit, or the purchase of securities, which 
member banks,147 such as JPMorgan, enter into with affiliate institutions—
in this case a wholly-owned subsidiary formed solely for the purpose of 
acquiring Bear Stearns.148  Additionally, section 23A “limit[s] the ability of 
                                                                                                                          
144 See supra Part II.D.  JPMorgan actually formed a wholly-owned subsidiary “solely for the 
purpose of consummating the merger.”  JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 25. 
145 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)A–B (2006); Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec’y of the 
Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, to Kathryn V. McCulloch, Senior V.P. & Assoc. Gen. Counsel of JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/ 
federalreserveact/2008/20080701/20080701.pdf (authorizing exemptions from provisions of the 
Federal Reserve to allow JPMorgan to finalize the acquisition of Bear Stearns); Letter from Robert de 
V. Frierson, Deputy Sec’y of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, to Kathleen A. Juhase, Senior V.P. & Assoc. 
Gen. Counsel of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (Aug. 20, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
BOARDDOCS/LegalInt/FederalReserveAct/2007/20070820c/20070820c.pdf (approving initial 
exemptions from the Federal Reserve Act authorizing JPMorgan to finance Bear’s daily operations). 
146 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)A–B.  Near identical restrictions apply pursuant to the Federal Reserve 
Board’s Regulation W, as codified in 12 C.F.R. § 223.11 (2009) and 12 C.F.R. § 223.12 (2009), which 
limit the aggregate amounts of transactions between member banks and single or multiple affiliates. 
147 The term “member bank” refers to depository firms which are members of the Federal Reserve 
System.  See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,560, 76,560 
(Dec. 12, 2002). 
148 Under section 23A, “covered transactions,” include “loan[s] or extension[s] of credit to . . . 
affiliate[s] . . . [and the] purchase of assets . . . from [affiliates].”  12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(A)(C).  An 
“affiliate” includes “any company that controls the member bank and any other company that is 
controlled by the company that controls the member bank.”  Id. § 371c(b)(1)(A).  When JPMorgan 
acquired Bear Stearns, it formed a wholly-owned subsidiary “solely for the purpose of consummating 
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a member bank to transfer its Federal subsidy to affiliates,” precluding 
non-member banks from accessing the Fed’s safety net.149  The intention of 
the law “is to prevent problems at the affiliate from endangering the 
[member] bank’s depositors.”150  Exemptions from these restrictions can 
only be granted by the Federal Reserve Board when found to be in the 
“public interest and consistent with the purposes of” section 23A.151 
As section 23A limits the “aggregate amount of covered transactions” 
that a member bank and an affiliate may engage in, the statute presented an 
impediment for Fed officials seeking to arrange the JPMorgan purchase of 
Bear in late March 2008.  Specifically, the statute would expressly prohibit 
JPMorgan (as a member bank) from taking over Bear, because the $29 
billion “extension of credit” that the arrangement involved was a “covered 
transaction” exceeding “20 per centum of the capital stock and surplus” of 
JPMorgan.152  Thus, if the purchase of Bear was to be consummated as 
planned, the transaction would be illegal and void under the Federal 
Reserve Act.153  This dilemma necessitated the utilization of an authorized 
exemption from the Federal Reserve Board to ensure that Bear’s 
bankruptcy could be avoided in a legitimate manner.154 
When JPMorgan first agreed to acquire Bear Stearns on March 16, 
2008, the Fed granted a temporary (eighteen-month) 23A exemption so 
that JPMorgan would be able to “finance the operations of Bear Stearns” 
and guarantee its outstanding debts.155  This initial exemption allowed 
JPMorgan to enter into transactions with Bear Stearns and its customers in 
aggregate amounts of up to fifty percent of JPMorgan’s “capital stock and 
surplus for the second quarter of 2008 (approximately $58 billion).”156  
Subsequently, three months after the initial temporary exemption was 
granted, on July 1, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board again suspended the 
application of section 23A, allowing JPMorgan to complete the purchase 
                                                                                                                          
the merger,” which would trigger the application of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.  
JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 25. 
149 Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. at 76,560; see also 
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING 
COMPANIES § 6.05 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the scope and purposes of sections 23A and 23B of the 
Federal Reserve Act). 
150 Brian Blackstone, Fed Agrees to Ease Some Rules for J.P. Morgan, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2008, 
at A2. 
151 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(2).  The purposes of section 23A have been declared by the Board as 
being two-fold: “(i) to protect against a deposit institution suffering losses in transactions with affiliates 
and (ii) to limit the ability of a deposit institution to transfer to its affiliates the subsidy arising from the 
institution’s access to the Federal safety net.”  Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to Kathryn McCulloch, 
supra note 145, at 3 (citation omitted). 
152 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(B). 
153 Id. 
154 See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to Kathleen Juhase, supra note 145, at 1–5 (granting and 
explaining the exemption from section 23A and setting conditions on the authorized transaction). 
155 Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to Kathryn McCulloch, supra note 145, at 6. 
156 Id. 
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of Bear Stearns’s assets for “approximately $44 billion.”157  In doing so, 
the Fed reduced the original March 16 aggregate ceiling to $5 billion, and 
declared the initial exemption void as of October 1, 2008.158 
In both instances, the Fed justified its actions in granting 23A 
exemptions based on past practices,159 and in allowing JPMorgan to 
complete the purchase of Bear Stearns, the Fed argued that the terms of the 
acquisition were substantially similar to those that would exist for 
“comparable transactions with unaffiliated companies,” as otherwise 
required by federal law.160  While these rationales may be valid, it remains 
unsettling that the Fed suspended enforcement of section 23A to permit the 
very type of transaction the law was enacted to prohibit.161  Most 
importantly, concerns surround the potential losses JPMorgan (and in turn 
its depositors) were exposed to during the Bear Stearns transactions, a 
primary issue that the enactors of section 23A meant to protect against.162  
“In effect, [these] 23A exemption[s] signaled the Federal Reserve’s 
willingness to allow troubled investment banks to shift their bad assets to 
insured commercial banks and thereby expose the Deposit Insurance Fund 
and U.S. taxpayers to a heightened risk of loss.”163  Additionally, by 
forwarding a federal subsidy through a member bank to Bear Stearns (a 
non-member institution) the Fed endorsed a collateralized transaction 
inconsistent with the underlying policy of “safe and sound banking 
practices,”164 and specifically restricted by the Federal Reserve Act.165 
The highly controversial nature of the Fed’s manipulation of its legal 
authority in these circumstances has led to internal disputes among 
                                                                                                                          
157 Id. at 3. 
158 Id. at 6. 
159 See id. at 3 (“The Board routinely has approved exemptions . . . for one-time asset transfers 
that are part of a corporate reorganization and that are structured to ensure the quality of the transferred 
assets.  The Board also has routinely approved exemptions . . . to facilitate the integration of recently 
merged companies.” (internal citations omitted)). 
160 See id. at 5 (“Section 23B [of the Federal Reserve Act] requires that the [JPMorgan 
acquisition] be on terms that are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to [JPMorgan], as those 
prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with unaffiliated companies.” (citation omitted)). 
Restrictions On Transactions with Affiliates. 
1.  A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in any of the transactions 
described in paragraph (2) only— 
A.  on terms and under circumstances, including credit standards, that are 
substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its 
subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions 
with or involving other nonaffiliated companies . . . . 
12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
161 See Transaction Between Members Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,560, 76,560–
62 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
162 See id. at 76,560 (“Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are important statutory 
provisions designed to protect against a depository institution suffering losses in transactions with 
affiliates.”). 
163 MCCOY, supra note 149. 
164 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(4). 
165 See id. § 371c(c)(3). 
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government officials as to the extent of the Central Bank’s power to 
manage financial crises.166  Ideologically, the Fed’s conduct during the 
Bear Stearns bailout signals a policy shift at the Central Bank that 
embraces government intervention in preventing the failure of private 
firms, a strategy unlike the traditional models which allowed for market 
correction, limited government involvement, and ultimately private failures 
and bankruptcies.  In turn, by becoming more involved in preventing the 
failure of private firms, the Fed has inherently increased the scope of its 
marketplace oversight—a result accomplished indirectly through the 
creation of new facilities and mechanisms implemented to protect ailing 
institutions.  These new facilities, coupled with the modification of existing 
tools, have become the foundation for a new Central Bank that is 
progressively intervening more deeply into the market, yet limited by legal 
authority devised for the twentieth century. 
C.  The Offspring of Emergency 
Early indications of the Fed’s expanding presence in the financial 
markets can be traced back to the week leading up to the bailout of Bear 
Stearns.  Mindful of the stigma attached to discount window borrowing, 
the Fed sought to stimulate lending in mid-March 2008 by relying on a 
supplementary loan tool initially developed in December 2007, known as 
the Term Auction Facility (“TAF”).167  Unlike the typical overnight 
lending done through the discount window, the TAF provides loans with 
longer maturity terms (such as twenty-eight days),168 and “[t]he TAF 
allows the Fed to determine the amount of reserves it wishes to lend out, 
based on market conditions.”169  TAF loans can be collateralized using the 
same types of assets accepted at the discount window (including MBS),170 
but the amounts offered through the TAF “have greatly exceeded discount 
window lending.”171 
For example, on March 7, 2008, the Fed announced it would increase 
the amounts outstanding in the TAF to $100 billion, and declared that the 
two auctions to be held in that month would be extended to $50 billion, 
                                                                                                                          
166 See Hilsenrath et al., supra note 142 (detailing frequent disagreements between former 
Treasury Secretary Paulson and Fed Chairman Bernanke over proper scope of Fed authority to respond 
to systemic threats to the economy). 
167 See Charles T. Carlstrom & Sarah Wakefield, The Funds Rate, Liquidity, and the Term 
Auction Facility, ECON. TRENDS, Dec. 2007, at 5, 6, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/ 
trends/2007/1207/ET_dec07.pdf (“One of the major changes for the Federal Reserve [in December 
2007] . . . was the institution of a ‘term auction facility’ (TAF) to supplement regular discount window 
borrowing.”). 
168 LABONTE, supra note 101, at 5. 
169 Id. 
170 See id. (“Like discount window lending, TAF loans must be fully collateralized with the same 
qualifying collateral [accepted at the discount window].”). 
171 Id. 
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$20 billion more than previously offered in February 2008.172  
Additionally, the Fed assumes the risk associated with a decline in the 
value of the collateral posted by private institutions in return for TAF 
loans, and questions have arisen as to whether this once temporary 
program will become permanent following reevaluation, albeit with 
reduced auction amounts.173  Because the funds distributed by the Fed 
through the TAF reflect market needs and anticipated demand for 
assistance, the TAF is a more controlled platform for lending as compared 
to the traditional discount window.174  In the fourth quarter of 2008, TAF 
lending and term limits had been extended to as much as $150 billion and 
eighty-five days respectively175—figures representative of the popularity 
(or necessity) of the TAF during the current financial crisis. 
Aside from the growing role of the TAF, “[o]n March 11, 2008, the 
Fed set up a more expansive securities lending program for the primary 
dealers called the Term Securities Lending Facility” (the “TSLF”).176  The 
TSLF allows the Fed to promote financial market operations by providing 
easy access to liquidity for those institutions the Fed regularly conducts 
transactions with and whose financial size and strength are directly related 
to the health of the financial system—the primary dealers.177  Lending 
through the TSLF can be in amounts of up to $200 billion in Treasury 
securities, for terms of twenty-eight days, and collateralized through a wide 
range of assets, including illiquid MBS.178  Initially, MBS collateral had to 
be AAA-rated; however, the Fed eventually broadened the types of eligible 
collateral to include “all investment-grade debt securities,” and changed 
TSLF auctions from biweekly to weekly in September 2008.179  The TSLF 
allows the largest financial institutions to regularly swap their 
unmarketable assets for easily marketable Treasury securities, which “is 
                                                                                                                          
172 See Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/monetary/20080307a.htm. 
173 See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 5. 
174 See id. (“Discount window lending is initiated at the behest of the requesting institution—the 
Fed has no control over how many requests for loans it receives.”). 
175 Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/monetary/20081006b.htm. 
176 LABONTE, supra note 101, at 6. 
177 See id. at 6 (explaining TSLF operations and providing technical definition of primary 
dealers); Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 14, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/monetary/20080914a.htm (explaining how the TSLF stimulates flow of liquidity 
between largest financial institutions).  For a discussion of the role of primary dealers, see Marco 
Arnone & George Iden, Primary Dealers in Government Securities: Policy Issues and Selected 
Countries’ Experience 3–10 (IMF Working Paper No. 03/45, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0345.pdf. 
178 See Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, The Role of Liquidity in Financial Crisis 6 (Sept. 4, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268367.  
Treasury securities include Treasury notes, bonds, and bills, backed by the Federal Government and, as 
such, are very safe investments.  U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Treasury Securities, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/treasuries.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). 
179 Press Release, Sept. 14, 2008, supra note 177. 
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intended to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and 
other collateral” and improve the overall performance of financial 
markets.180 
Finally, following JPMorgan’s announced acquisition of Bear Stearns 
on March 16, 2008, the Fed launched yet another new lending tool 
designated the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (“PDCF”), which was 
designed to improve access to discount window-type loans to primary 
dealers.181  The PDCF was created pursuant to the emergency lending 
provisions of section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, and “provides 
primary dealers with a liquidity backstop similar to the discount window 
for deposit institutions in generally sound financial condition.”182  Because 
many primary dealers, such as Bear Stearns, could not previously pledge 
their collateral for direct discount window loans from the Fed, the PDCF 
seems to have been the result of Fed frustration in attempting to work 
within its legal authority in loaning funds to non-member institutions.  As 
with the TSLF, the PDCF initially required investment-grade securities as 
collateral for overnight or short-term loans; however, the Fed has 
subsequently broadened the acceptable PDCF collateral to include assets 
exchanged in repo markets.183  From its inception, the PDCF seems to have 
contributed to growing lending confidence among primary dealers and 
their counterparties, yet the very fact that the PDCF has been extended into 
2009 suggests that market conditions remain abnormal.184 
The Fed’s use of the TAF, TSLF, PDCF, and other facilities185 raises 
                                                                                                                          
180 LABONTE, supra note 101, at 6 (citation omitted). 
181 See Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealer Credit Facility, http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
markets/pdcf.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (“The . . . (PDCF) is an overnight loan facility that will 
provide funding to primary dealers in exchange for a specified range of eligible collateral that is 
intended to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally.”). 
182 Bernanke, Atlanta I, supra note 126. 
183 See Press Release, Sept. 14, 2008, supra note 177 (“The collateral eligible to be pledged at the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) has been broadened to closely match the types of collateral that 
can be pledged in the tri-party repo systems of the two major clearing banks.”). 
184 See Bernanke, Atlanta I, supra note 126 (discussing improvement in confidence among 
primary dealers and their counterparties and noting that despite improvement in confidence, financial 
markets “are still far from normal”); Press Release, Fed. Reserve (July 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080730a.htm (announcing the Fed’s 
extension of the PDCF until January 30, 2009). 
185 The Fed has developed numerous facilities, other than the ones previously described, in an 
ongoing effort to stimulate liquidity transfers in financial markets and promote confidence between 
counterparties.  For example, in October 2008, the Fed created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(“CPFF”), which provides a “liquidity backstop” to domestic providers of commercial paper by 
allowing the Fed to purchase “three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper directly from 
eligible issuers.”  Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm.  Likewise, in late November 2008, the Fed instituted the 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”), which allows the New York Fed to “lend up to 
$200 billion on a non-recourse basis to holders of certain AAA-rated ABS backed by newly and 
recently originated consumer and small business loans.”  Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Nov. 25, 2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081125a.htm.  The TALF is designed to 
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important questions about the expanding intervention of the federal 
government in our free market economy, as well as the threat to economic 
independence and innovation that the Fed’s growing presence poses.  
Similarly, skepticism as to the tools utilized by the Fed to combat ailing 
market operations emphasizes the concern that the Fed’s policy responses 
may indirectly promote moral hazard.186  These issues have incited a 
consensus that regulatory reform is overdue and will be a major 
undertaking of the Obama administration and the 111th Congress.187 
IV.  INADEQUACIES IMPAIRING INTERVENTION 
A.  The Call for Regulatory Reform188 
Four months after Bear Stearns was saved from bankruptcy, Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the House Committee on 
Financial Services to “discuss financial regulation and financial 
stability.”189  Using Bear Stearns as an example, Bernanke suggested that 
the current regulatory framework for the financial system was inadequately 
structured to respond to and remedy problems posed by contemporary 
investment banks and products.190  In particular, Bernanke explained that 
limited oversight of investment banking practices and sophisticated 
investment vehicles had contributed to the creation of a financial system 
more advanced than the laws that governed it.191  As in Bear Stearns’s 
case, private institutions (and the market as a whole) had evolved to the 
extent that a single firm’s failure could bring the entire system to its 
                                                                                                                          
make it “easier for consumers to borrow money,” thus easing lending markets and stimulating growth.  
Deborah Solomon, New Facility Targets Consumer Lending, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2008, at C1. 
186 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Greater Austin 
Chamber of Commerce: Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis (Dec. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, 
Austin] (“[I]ntervening to prevent the failure of a financial firm is counterproductive, because it leads 
to erosion of market discipline and creates moral hazard.”). 
187 See id. (“In the longer term, the development of a statutory framework for resolving 
systemically critical nonbank financial institutions in ways that do not destabilize the financial system 
as a whole must be another key priority.”). 
188 This section discusses the impetus for reform of the regulatory structure of the financial system 
within the narrow realm of the investment banking industry and the expanding role of the Federal 
Reserve as a central administrator.  Therefore, consideration of broader regulatory reform that may be 
appropriate in other contexts (such as the mortgage industry) is beyond the scope of this Note. 
189 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the House 
Comm. on Fin. Servs. (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
testimony/bernanke20080710a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, Fin. Servs.]. 
190 See id. (“[I]n light of the Bear Stearns episode, Congress may wish to consider whether new 
tools are needed for ensuring an orderly liquidation of a systemically important securities firm that is 
on the verge of bankruptcy, together with a more formal process for deciding when to use those 
tools.”). 
191 See id. (“Congress should consider granting the Federal Reserve explicit oversight authority 
for systemically important payment and settlement systems.”). 
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knees.192  Known as “systemic risk,”193 the occurrence of this phenomenon 
necessarily prompts the intervention of the federal government.194  
However, the nature of that intervention has come under intense scrutiny in 
the wake of Bear Stearns.195  Specifically, the scope of the Fed’s authority 
as lender of last resort during systemic crisis remains obscure in the 
context of nonbank institutions that traditionally were not subject to Fed 
oversight.196  “The decision to treat Bear Stearns as if it were a commercial 
bank appears to have marked a permanent shift in the governance of 
financial services firms.”197  Likewise, as Professor Steven Schwarcz of 
Duke University School of Law has noted, de facto bailouts of 
systemically important institutions facing bankruptcy focus merely on 
“symptoms of the disease . . . not on the disease’s underlying cause.”198  
Thus, the Fed’s capacity to respond to financial distress appears 
constrained by both the lack of a robust supervisory mandate and a limited 
number of tools available to protect the nation’s economy.199  For example, 
although the Fed can issue emergency loans to nonbank financial 
institutions, “such loans must be backed by collateral sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurance that they will be repaid; if such collateral is not 
available, the Fed cannot lend.”200  And while the Fed “serves as the 
umbrella supervisor of all bank holding companies,” nonbank institutions 
are generally supervised by other agencies that lack the resources and legal 
authority of the Fed.201 
Discrepancies between the Central Bank’s status as “umbrella 
                                                                                                                          
192 See id. (“[T]he stability of the broader financial system requires key payment and settlement 
systems to operate smoothly under stress to effectively manage counterparty risk.”). 
193 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (“A common factor in 
the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event, such as an economic shock or 
institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino 
effect.”); see also Olivier De Bandt & Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey 10–11 (Eur. Cent. 
Bank, Working Paper No. 35, 2000), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp035.pdf.  
Systemic risk as a focus of regulation is discussed infra Part V.A. 
194 See Mishkin, supra note 130 (explaining the necessity of the central bank as lender of last 
resort during systemic financial crises). 
195 See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“[I]n the rare circumstances in which the 
impending or actual failure of an institution imposes substantial systemic risks, the standard procedures 
for resolving institutions may be inadequate.”). 
196 See Bernanke, Fin. Servs., supra note 189 (“[U]nder current arrangements, the SEC’s 
oversight of the holding companies of the major investment banks is based on a voluntary agreement 
between the SEC and those firms.”). 
197 David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 740 (2008) (reviewing 
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL 
ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008)). 
198 Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L. 
REV. 209, 214 (2008). 
199 See, e.g., Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9. 
200 Bernanke, Austin, supra note 186. 
201 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Allied Social Science Association 
Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20070105a.htm. 
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supervisor” and its restricted oversight of investment and securities firms is 
largely the result of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the 
“GLBA”).202  In passing the GLBA, “Congress was cognizant of the fact 
that functional regulation for securities [subsidiaries of depository 
institutions], when combined with the traditional oversight powers of the 
[Fed], had the potential to create added regulatory burdens for bank and 
financial holding companies.”203  Therefore, the GLBA directed the Fed 
“to limit the focus and scope of [its] examinations” into nonbank 
institutions (i.e., investment banks) subject to alternative regulatory 
schemes, and “forego examinations [of these firms] in lieu of reviewing 
examination reports by the [SEC].”204  Unfortunately, this division of 
responsibility severely curtails the Fed’s ability to anticipate systemic risks 
posed by investment banks and financial institutions, especially when the 
SEC does not live up to its obligations.  As Professor Patricia McCoy of 
the University of Connecticut School of Law explains, “[the GLBA] 
essentially envisions systemic risk as risk that is confined to one sector (for 
example, the banking sector as opposed to the securities sector).  As 
financial services become more intricate and interdependent, however, that 
assumption [along with the efficacy of patchwork regulation] must be 
questioned.”205  Indeed, Bear’s primary regulator, the SEC, “played almost 
no role” in Bear’s rescue, suggesting that the Fed’s principal regulation of 
commercial banks may be obsolete and too narrow-minded given today’s 
reality.206 
The regulatory deficiencies that seem to impair the Fed’s ability to 
effectively respond to systemic threats are even more pronounced 
considering the fact that “the Fed is the only agency that has the power to 
serve as a liquidity provider of last resort, a power that has proved critical 
in financial crises throughout history.”207  Because the Fed has come to 
assume the risk associated with loans to previously unregulated 
institutions, officials contend that increased supervision of such firms by 
the Fed is only reasonable and in keeping with the Fed’s obligation to 
                                                                                                                          
202 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809, 6821–6827 (1999). 
203 PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL, BANK AND THRIFT SUPERVISION 
§ 2.04(1)(a)(ii) (2009). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 See Skeel, supra note 197, at 735–36; see also Kristen French, Wall Street Turf Wars: SEC 
Versus Fed, July 24, 2008, http://registeredrep.com/regulatory/sec_versus_fed_0724/index.html 
(“There has been some speculation that the Federal Reserve would begin to regulate investment banks 
much in the same way that it regulates commercial banks today, requiring them to compute capital 
requirements and maintain liquidity levels on a consolidated basis, and discouraging certain kinds of 
financial risk-taking.”). 
207 Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9. 
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promote overall financial stability.208  Of course, “[w]ith the Fed bearing 
apex responsibility for U.S. financial stability, it is reasonable to ask 
whether it enjoys sufficiently broad oversight authorities.”209  Given its 
“macroeconomic objectives” of “maximum sustainable employment and 
price stability,”210 Fed leaders have stressed the importance of enhanced 
oversight authority as a necessity for accomplishing its directives.211  
Ideally, providing the Fed with greater supervisory powers would limit the 
need to issue emergency loans in the future, as the Central Bank could use 
policy initiatives to deter investment operations that lead to systemic risk.  
In this way, the financial system as a whole, and the American taxpayer, 
would be better protected from future instances of market disruption 
caused by irresponsible trade practices.  If the Fed were better able to 
anticipate failures among individual firms or markets, it would be less 
likely that gaps in the regulatory structure would afflict the broader 
economy.212 
These issues have led some officials to argue that a unified system of 
financial regulation under the direction of the Fed would make the most 
sense in light of the oversight failures of the past year.213  In fact, the 
heterogeneous makeup of the existing regulatory system has been 
criticized as unduly redundant, inefficient, and archaic, and a liability to 
the security of the future financial industry.214  Even before the onset of the 
current crisis, empirical evidence suggested that those countries that had a 
                                                                                                                          
208 See Irwin, supra note 124 (“[Former] Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. said that if 
investment banks are given permanent access to the Fed’s emergency funds, they should have the same 
kind of supervision that the Fed requires for conventional banks.”). 
209 Vir Bhatia, supra note 17, at 17 (emphasis omitted). 
210 Kevin Warsh, Governor of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the New York State 
Economics Association’s 60th Annual Conference: Financial Stability and the Federal Reserve (Oct. 5, 
2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20071005a.htm. 
211 See Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9 (“[H]olding the Fed more formally accountable for 
promoting financial stability makes sense only if the institution’s powers are consistent with its 
responsibilities.”); Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Exchequer Club 
Luncheon (Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
kohn20070221a.htm (“The Federal Reserve’s activities as a bank supervisor provide us with important 
and sometimes critical information . . . . Thus, I want to take this opportunity to emphasize and 
reinforce the case for central bank involvement in bank supervision.”). 
212 See Browne, supra note 17, at 385–87 (discussing how gaps in the regulatory structure of the 
financial industry impair the nation’s global competitiveness). 
213 See Scannell, supra note 13 (“‘What makes more sense [than the current approach] is to have a 
unified system of financial-services regulation.’” (quoting Harvey Pitt, former SEC Chairman)). 
214 See Norman D. Slonaker, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized 
Financial Structure, 1708 PRAC. L. INST. 955, 958 (2008). 
The current regulatory system of separate agencies across functional lines (banking, 
insurance, securities and futures) has resulted in: 
i.    No single regulator with all the information and authority to monitor 
systemic risk and coordinate action throughout the financial system 
ii.      Jurisdictional disputes among the agencies 
iii.     Regulatory redundancies  
iv.     Inefficiency and loss of U.S. competitive advantage 
Id. 
 2009] CRISIS COMPOUNDED BY CONSTRAINT 679 
unified supervisory and monetary program enjoyed fewer bank failures in 
the 1980s and 1990s than countries that separated such responsibilities 
among different agencies.215  Together with other statutory reforms 
designed to streamline government oversight of nonbank institutions and 
complex securities,216 proponents of enhanced Fed supervision within the 
financial services industry argue that the Central Bank is the most 
economic platform from which to shape the future regulatory structure.217 
Currently, Fed officials are attempting to clarify the Central Bank’s 
existing supervisory protocol in an effort to increase awareness as to the 
Fed’s oversight abilities.218  It remains to be seen whether the results of this 
internal review will reinforce arguments for the revision of financial 
regulation.  Needless to say, as the market continues to adjust to the barren 
landscape of the post-housing bubble, commentators have observed that 
the lack of a clear regulatory structure is hindering economic recovery.219  
Still, others doubt whether increased regulation is the answer to recurring 
economic crises, and even public officials have warned that rushing to 
regulation is imprudent.220 
B.  Private Skepticism 
Amidst the seemingly ubiquitous appeals for tougher regulation, 
                                                                                                                          
215 See Joseph G. Haubrich, Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF CLEVELAND, Nov. 1996, http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Commentary/1996/1196. 
htm. 
216 For example, the Treasury Department has suggested that the SEC and CFTC merge to afford 
consolidated oversight and regulation of the securities and futures markets.  See DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 11 (2008), 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.  Additionally, Chairman 
Bernanke has suggested that a new regulatory regime be developed specifically for nonbank 
institutions.  See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“A statutory resolution regime for nonbanks, 
besides reducing uncertainty, would also limit moral hazard by allowing the government to resolve 
failing firms in a way that is orderly but also wipes out equity holders and haircuts some creditors, 
analogous to what happens when a commercial bank fails.”). 
217 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 216, at 146–56 (detailing how the Fed’s current 
responsibilities and authority complement the expanded protocol suggested by the Treasury 
Department). 
218 See David L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm. 
on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (June 5, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
testimony/kohn20080605a.htm (“The Federal Reserve is nearing completion of enhancements to its 
supervisory guidance to clarify [its] role as consolidated supervisor of bank and financial holding 
companies . . . . The updated guidance is primarily intended to provide greater clarification to [its] own 
examination staff.”). 
219 See Tyler Cowen, Was an Old Bailout a Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at BU5 
(“Regulatory uncertainty is stifling the ability of financial markets to engineer at least a partial 
recovery.”). 
220 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at New York University Law School: 
Financial Regulation and the Invisible Hand (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070411a.htm (“[T]he benefits of regulation come with direct and 
indirect costs.  Direct costs include those arising from compliance with a thicket of complicated 
rules . . . . Indirect costs include reductions in innovation or competition that can result from overly 
restrictive regulations.”). 
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skeptics have voiced their dissent in an attempt to explain why this most 
recent economic catastrophe should cause lawmakers to pause before 
instituting a mass overhaul of the existing regulatory structure. 
Critics of such a legislative renovation, both in the United States and 
abroad, argue that more regulation may simply be ineffective in preventing 
future crises given the incredibly complex nature of today’s financial 
markets.221  For example, Professor Tyler Cowen of George Mason 
University has explained that “regulators will never be in a position to 
accurately evaluate . . . many of the most important market 
transactions.”222  Because of the intricate web of international finance, 
which involves highly sophisticated players and trillions of dollars, 
government regulators lack the resources to use reform as a means to 
prevent disaster.223  Instead, “the real issue is setting strong regulatory 
priorities to prevent outright fraud and to encourage market transparency, 
given that government scrutiny will never be universal or even close to 
it.”224  Similarly, using government to restrain un-regulated financial 
sectors after they have wreaked havoc on the system may not be the best 
guide for controlling future threats.225  As some commentators have 
pointed out, the debate over the future of regulation has arisen in the smog 
of disaster, and a complete reconsideration of traditional models of reform 
may be necessary.226 
Additionally, the possibility that reform will create a slippery slope of 
government abuses and outright favoritism has made headlines in the 
United Kingdom, where revised banking policies have been criticized as 
allowing the public sector to “cherry-pick assets and transfer them to a 
private sector buyer.”227  Interestingly, the United Kingdom delegates the 
responsibility of bank and financial services supervision to a single agency, 
the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”).228  As a central hub of financial 
oversight, the FSA draws on expansive regulatory powers to influence and 
observe market operations, and functions independently of the Bank of 
                                                                                                                          
221 See Cowen, supra note 2, at BU7 (“[I]t’s not obvious that the less regulated financial sector 
performed any worse than the highly regulated housing and bank mortgage lending sectors, including, 
of course, the government-sponsored mortgaged agencies.”). 
222 Id. 
223 See id. 
224 Id. 
225 See id. 
226 See Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, The Sub-Prime Crisis: Causal Distortions and 
Regulatory Reform, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL OF 2007 AND 2008 55, 66 (Paul 
Bloxham & Christopher Kent eds., 2008), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAnd 
Research/Conferences/2008/Blundell-Wignall_Atkinson.pdf (“There needs to be some new thinking 
about reform of the regulatory and policy-making paradigms for the longer run.”). 
227 Philip Aldrick, Banking Reforms Will Jeopardise Financial Industry, Say Lawyers, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 4, 2008, at 3 (quoting Bob Penn, Regulatory Partner, Allen & Overy). 
228 See About the FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 
16, 2009) (providing links to details on the scope, objectives, and structure of the FSA). 
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England.229  This separation of central banking and banking supervision is 
emphasized by critics who reject the expanding role of the Fed as a 
financial administrator over nonbanks.230  Those who endorse the United 
Kingdom’s regulatory approach contend that increased independence of 
financial regulators allows flexibility in governance, which in turn 
promotes efficient use of resources and generally more effective 
policies.231  By adopting a “principles-based” methodology of supervision 
that encourages voluntary compliance by private institutions, the FSA has 
been commended for promoting market discipline.232  Furthermore, by 
removing supervisory responsibilities from the purview of a central bank, 
and thereby reducing its oversight authority, some scholars have argued 
that the risk that a conflict of interest would impede the Fed’s ability to 
impose monetary restraint out of concern for banks is largely reduced if not 
eliminated, by the FSA paradigm.233  With countries such as Korea, Japan, 
India, and South Africa moving toward systems that mirror those of the 
United Kingdom,234 questions will soon arise as to how the United States 
should proceed and what the future role of the Fed should be. 
Finally, even public officials have cautioned that added regulation 
cannot threaten the ability of market participants to develop innovative 
business models or investment products.235  Although the existing 
framework does not seem to promote American competitiveness in key 
global markets,236 any new regulatory system for the financial industry 
should not be “counterproductive” by encouraging parties to conduct their 
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230 See C.A.E. Goodhart, The Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision 8–23 (Fin. 
Stability Inst. Occasional Papers No. 1, 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers01.pdf 
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banking supervision). 
231 See Harvey L. Pitt, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-First Century, 25 
YALE J. ON REG. 315, 321–23 (discussing the benefits of the FSA model of supervision as contrasted 
with that of the SEC); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Financial Markets Conference: Regulation and Financial Innovation (May 
15, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070515a.htm 
[hereinafter Bernanke, Atlanta II] (describing the FSA’s “[p]rinciples-based” supervisory approach as 
concentrating government resources and attention to those “firms, markets, or instruments in proportion 
to the perceived risks to the FSA’s regulatory objectives”). 
232 See Pitt, supra note 231, at 321–23 (describing how the FSA’s approach is more efficient than 
traditional models employed by American organizations); John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial 
Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 383–87 (2008) (discussing the mechanics of 
“principles-based” regulation as adopted by the FSA and some American organizations, and the praise 
and criticism “principles-based” regulation has garnered). 
233 See Goodhart, supra note 230, at 20–23 (discussing how separating supervision from central 
banking works to reduce the occurrence of conflicts of interest with regard to the creation of monetary 
policy). 
234 See id. at 6–7. 
235 See Kohn, supra note 211 (advising that regulations which attempt to anticipate and control all 
possible systemic threats may unduly restrict market growth). 
236 See Browne, supra note 17, at 393–410 (discussing how U.S. firms are losing influence in 
various markets as a result of current regulatory deficiencies). 
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business overseas.237  With the major U.S. investment banks now all 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, some argue that the Fed no longer 
needs enhanced supervisory powers over nonbanks to successfully monitor 
market threats.  However, as discussed in Part V, existing oversight 
restrictions continue to limit the Fed’s capacity to adopt a prophylactic risk 
management policy.238  Obviously, striking the right balance between 
laissez-faire and new financial regulation is a complicated issue that 
remains a key focus of those at the Fed and on Capitol Hill.  Therefore, the 
remainder of this Note draws on existing scholarly work devoted to the 
challenge of improving banking and financial system oversight with the 
goal of increasing dialogue as to the proper role of the Fed in such future 
regulatory schemes. 
V.  GOING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT BANK REGULATION 
A.  An Attempt at Reconciliation 
It goes without saying that the goal of regulators in implementing any 
new framework of investment banking and financial system oversight 
should be to focus on the most important threats to economic stability 
facing our country.  While some may argue that those threats range from 
unbridled greed to government incompetence, the key concern of 
lawmakers should be the contemporary nature of systemic risk.239  As the 
current crisis illustrates, systemic risk has developed into a cross-sector 
cancer, capable of emerging within the securities realm and spreading to 
the banking and credit sectors.  This development stresses the jurisdictional 
boundaries of federal agencies, reducing the capacity of the Fed or similar 
regulators to respond to systemic risks in accordance with existing legal 
authority.240  Because “[f]ederal banking agencies are specifically barred 
from examining registered investment company subsidiaries,” the Fed 
must rely on inconsistent piecemeal examinations of these firms, which 
themselves are subject to “stringent restrictions.”241  For example, as the 
                                                                                                                          
237 See Neikirk et al., supra note 119, at C1 (“Those who oppose too many new federal 
regulations on Wall Street investment banking firms fear such a move could be highly 
counterproductive and drive more financial transactions overseas to London, Hong Kong, or other 
spots.”). 
238 See MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1) (describing how the existing scheme of banking 
regulation is duplicative and inefficient). 
239 See Robert W. Hahn & Peter Passell, The Rush to Reregulate, AEI ON THE ISSUES, Aug. 20, 
2008, http://www.aei.org/issue/28495 (“The most easily justifiable rationale for [government] 
intervention is the potential for damage to those not directly involved—for example, people who lose 
their savings in bank runs when credit markets freeze.”). 
240 MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii); see also Schwarcz, supra note 193, at 198–204 
(discussing how systemic risks faced by individual institutions and markets should not be considered in 
isolation when defining systemic risk as a focus of regulation). 
241 MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii). 
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GLBA mandates, the Fed may only examine “functionally regulated 
subsidiaries” (including investment banks) in three instances: (1) where the 
Fed has “reasonable cause to believe” the activities of the subsidiary “pose 
a material risk to an affiliated depository institution[;]” (2) where the Fed 
“reasonably determines” an examination is needed to assess the propriety 
of the internal monitoring and control systems of the subsidiary; and (3) 
where the Fed has “reasonable cause to believe” a subsidiary is in violation 
of federal law within its jurisdiction.242  These provisions effectively 
preclude the Fed from undertaking routine examinations of investment 
banks, thereby increasing the potential for risks to go unnoticed.  
Additionally, the GLBA specifically prohibits federal banking agencies 
from inspecting or examining any “registered investment company that is 
not a bank holding company or a savings and loan company.”243  And, 
although “the FDIC has full authority to examine any affiliate of a 
depository institution[,]” it can only do so when “necessary to disclose 
fully the relationship between the two companies and the effect of that 
relationship on the depository institution’s condition.”244 
Loopholes such as these inhibit the effective management of risks 
within the investment banking and financial sectors, impairing the Fed’s 
ability to protect the commercial banking industry.  Given the potential for 
systemic threats to devastate various markets and the real economy, 
enhancing the Fed’s capabilities at anticipating and reacting to systemic 
risks within the financial and investment contexts is a necessity.  This 
argument is supported by the fact that major domestic investment banks 
have now become subsidiaries of bank holding companies, thereby 
augmenting the importance of a consistent and unified structure of 
supervision.245  With the protection of individual depositors now directly 
intertwined with the stability of investment companies previously 
operating in relative isolation, systemic risk is no longer an abstract 
anomaly confined to the plush offices of Wall Street executives and 
investors—it is now a concern of all American taxpayers. 
Therefore, as the primary guardian of banking stability, the Fed ought 
to be given greater powers to supervise investment banks and other 
financial companies whose fate can now affect the lives of millions of 
Americans.  As Professor McCoy suggests, “where an investment 
company is located in a subsidiary of a bank or thrift, consolidating safety 
and soundness examinations in the deposit institution’s primary federal 
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243 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1820a(a) (2006). 
244 MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
245 See Bernanke, Atlanta II, supra note 231 (“Rather than addressing specific institutions or 
instruments in isolation, regulators should begin by identifying their objectives and then address the 
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basics, we can increase the coherence, consistency, and effectives of the regulatory framework.”). 
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banking supervisor would make for better informed examinations.”246  Of 
course, this is not to say that systemic risk should become a scapegoat for 
irresponsible reform measures which do more harm to the country’s 
economic prowess than protect it.  Because future systemic risks may be 
considered unavoidable occurrences of free market ideology and even 
human behavior, regulation alone will be insufficient in preventing all 
future occurrences of systemic threats.247  Instead, a “private initiative that 
will complement official oversight in encouraging [responsible] industry-
wide practices” is an essential feature of any future regulatory agenda.248  
Nonetheless, “market discipline often needs to be buttressed by 
government oversight,”249 and the Fed should be granted greater powers 
over investment banks with respect to reporting, regulation, examinations, 
capital requirements, and enforcement. 
1.  Reporting to the Fed 
Imposing tougher reporting and disclosure requirements on investment 
banks and their managers has the additional benefit of improving a firm’s 
internal culture of risk appreciation and understanding.  In other words, if 
investment banks are required to disclose quarterly or semi-annual reviews 
of balance-sheet status or investment outlooks, irresponsible risk taking 
will become less of a clandestine affliction.250  Utilizing existing reporting 
models for commercial banks would prove useful in this regard,251 as 
would repealing provisions of the GLBA which inhibit the Fed’s 
examination of “functionally regulated subsidiaries.”252  No longer should 
the Fed be responsible for supervising the risks posed by investment banks 
“with one hand tied behind its back,” and investment banks and their 
managers should be held responsible for filing accurate “quarterly reports 
of condition” directly with the Federal Reserve, instead of the SEC, CFTC, 
                                                                                                                          
246 MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii). 
247 See Alan L. Beller, Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform—The Report of the 
CRMPG III, Aug. 6, 2008—Excerpts, 1704 PRAC. L. INST. 19, 39 (2008) (“The fact that financial 
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249 Bernanke, Atlanta II, supra note 231. 
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practices); see also MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.03(2) (“Periodic reports of condition by individual 
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insured institutions must file with federal regulators). 
252 Id. § 12.03(1)–(2) (“Because of its enormous exposure to losses . . . the federal government 
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(emphasis added)).  Professor McCoy describes how the GLBA sought to streamline reporting 
requirements for companies subject to oversight by multiple regulators, but may have “swayed too far” 
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late.  Id. § 12.03(2). 
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or other functional regulators.253  Additionally, legislation aimed at 
creating new reporting standards may want to consider the value of 
independent auditing, public disclosures, and mandatory penalties for 
“false reports or late filings.”254  Finally, Chief Risk Officers or 
comparable executives within investment banks should develop a working 
relationship with Fed examiners that fosters enhanced transparency and 
promotes greater market discipline.255 
2.  Regulation 
Granting the Fed greater regulatory powers over investment banks will 
necessarily conflict with the jurisdictional authority of the SEC.  However, 
given the critical role played by the lender of last resort during systemic 
crisis, the Fed should be granted “the authority to set expectations and 
require corrective actions as warranted in cases in which firms’ actions 
have potential implications for financial stability.”256  The Central Bank 
should also have the ability to establish prospective regulations designed to 
limit the need for emergency discount window loans.  For example, by 
instituting a clear process by which the Fed can manage the anticipated 
insolvency of an investment bank, the likelihood that a disorderly failure 
will instill fear in the markets is reduced, as is the potential for banks runs 
and contagion.257  Additionally, as Chairman Bernanke has argued, the 
Fed’s oversight of “systemically important payment and settlement 
systems” must be explicitly delineated so that the Fed can ensure that these 
systems remain fluid in crisis situations.258  As a benefit to the firms, 
greater regulation should, in turn, allow investment banks greater access to 
the Fed’s “discount . . . window under nonemergency circumstances.”259  
But, such access must not be seen as an excuse to ignore market 
discipline.260  The SEC should develop policies intended to assist the Fed 
in overseeing the operations of investment banks, yet “consolidated 
supervision” of these firms is more efficient than the process currently in 
                                                                                                                          
253 See id. (“The Federal Reserve Board and its fellow agencies should not be dependent . . . on 
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258 Bernanke, Fin. Servs., supra note 189. 
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place.261  Therefore, the Fed’s supervisory role should be extended to 
include oversight of investment banking and financial services firms, 
which are now subsidiaries of depository institutions.  New regulations 
necessary to protect economic stability should be adopted with the 
understanding that flexibility and some risk taking are vital to fostering 
growth and innovation.262 
3.  Examinations 
Creating a detailed examination process for the Fed to use in 
overseeing financial services firms is critical.  In keeping with its new role 
as consolidated supervisor of investment banks, the Fed’s examination 
authority should be enhanced to mirror that which exists for traditional 
depository institutions.263  For example, “[s]afety and soundness 
examinations” which generally assess a commercial bank’s infrastructure 
in key areas such as “solvency,” “management,” and “information 
technology,” ought to be implemented with new standards for investment 
banks.264  Additionally, “compliance examinations” which focus on a 
firm’s compliance with applicable “consumer and investor protection 
laws” should be instituted to ensure that investment banks maintain 
legitimate market operations.265  A rating system that appraises vital 
elements of a firm’s operations may be beneficial, and examinations 
should be conducted regularly so as to identify potential threats or risks 
within single or multiple institutions.266  To accommodate the concerns of 
the private sector, an “appeals process” similar to that used for depository 
institutions would be useful in checking government discretion and 
improving the accuracy of examinations.267  “To fulfill its responsibilities, 
the Fed would also need to have the ability to look at financial firms as a 
whole, much as the [Fed does] today when [it] exercise[s] [its] umbrella 
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authority over financial holding companies . . . .”268  Increased 
examinations of investment banks will provide Fed officials with 
information necessary to enhance the efficacy of the government’s 
containment of systemic risk, reducing threats to other sectors of the 
economy and protecting individual consumers.  When appropriate, the 
results of examinations should be published to allow the interested public 
the opportunity to review the state of an individual firm’s business 
model.269  Of course, such disclosures must be mindful of the threat of 
bank runs that co-exists with the public’s interpretation of a company’s 
financial health.270 
4.  Capital Requirements 
Another crucial factor in improving the Fed’s ability to contain 
systemic risk is ensuring that investment banks have the necessary capital 
resources to prevent the liquidity crisis Bear Stearns and other institutions 
have recently faced.  Leverage ratios must be controlled to guard against 
the possibility of future government bailouts and reduce the occurrence of 
moral hazard.271  Fortunately, proposals such as those announced in Pillar 1 
of the Basel II Capital Accord provide detailed and practical frameworks 
that the Fed can utilize in determining the best method for setting capital 
reserve minimums for investment banks.272  Because depositors now have 
an interest in the solvency of securities firms, leverage ratios must remain 
conservative enough to protect against bankruptcy and illiquidity 
quagmires.  For those depository institutions that have now become the 
parent company of investment bank subsidiaries, the Fed must make 
certain that the vast resources of a depository institution do not become 
indirect incentives for investment banks to assume more debt than the 
subsidiary can afford.  Thus, to provide the most protection for depositors, 
reserve standards for investment bank subsidiaries should remain 
independent of those of the parent holding company.  Also, sections 23A 
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act must remain key safeguards in 
restricting the types and extent of transactions that depository institutions 
can engage in with their affiliates and counterparties.273  At no time should 
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a “covered transaction” imperil the security and liquidity of any depositor’s 
account,274 and regularly conducted examinations should stress the 
consistency of an investment bank’s capitalization to confirm that the 
subsidiaries’ leverage does not affect the health of the depository 
institution. 
5.  Enforcement 
How the Fed goes about enforcing its oversight authority over 
investment banks is open to vast commentary.  Nonetheless, the existing 
structure of formal and informal275 enforcement mechanisms for 
commercial institutions may again provide useful guidance in this respect.  
For example, aside from the “examination process[es],” “board resolutions 
and commitment letters,” and “supervisory directives,” which comprise the 
bulk of informal bank supervision, the Fed should also be allowed to 
impose “cease-and-desist orders,” officer and director suspension (and 
removal or prohibition), and civil monetary penalties against securities 
firms when federal regulatory compliance is lacking, or the investment 
bank’s practices deviate from “generally accepted standards of prudent 
operation.”276  Additionally, lawmakers may want to consider the potential 
benefits afforded by “agency adjudication”277 and public disclosure278 in 
insuring that investment banks maintain acceptable investment and risk 
portfolios.  However, it is vital that a proper balance between regulatory 
enforcement and market independence be maintained.  In this regard, 
enforcement mechanisms may in some circumstances be subject to judicial 
review,279 with top Fed officials periodically assessing enforcement 
standards to confirm that regulation is not stifling market progression and 
economic growth. 
At the risk of oversimplifying the problems inherent in creating a new 
regulatory framework for investment banks, the preceding discussion has 
offered several suggestions for improvement of the Fed’s oversight 
authority in the financial services industry.  Clearly, the topics focused on 
do not exist exclusively from one another or in isolation of other 
considerations which are relevant to this issue.  For instance, complications 
will soon arise when one factors in the important issues of private sector 
reluctance, global central bank policy coordination,280 and securities-
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specific regulation.281  Nevertheless, each contribution to this topic 
encourages the reform that is essential to economic recovery. 
B.  The Current Reality 
The global economic crisis that continues to wreak havoc in the United 
States and other countries is as far-reaching as it is complex.  For nearly 
two years, the world has witnessed the destruction of financial 
powerhouses, the deterioration of the stock and credit markets, and 
repeated attempts by political leaders to rejuvenate the economy through 
unprecedented government programs. Unfortunately, the crisis 
demonstrates how regulatory inadequacies have allowed irresponsible and 
reckless trade practices to create a worldwide catastrophe not seen since 
the 1930s.  “For years, too many Wall Street executives made imprudent 
and dangerous decisions, seeking profits with too little regard for risk, too 
little regulatory scrutiny, and too little accountability.”282  The excesses of 
greed and carelessness have been seen by all Americans who have suffered 
from the exploitation of investment products by financial firms and their 
managers.  Moreover, vast sums of public money have been taken from the 
coffers of taxpayers in an effort to rescue the financial system from those 
who have profited from its unrestrained manipulation.  As this disaster best 
illustrates, a robust and dynamic twenty-first century economy cannot 
survive in the midst of such abuses. 
Because of the diversity of problems posed by the current recession, 
investment banking and financial services regulatory reform is likely to be 
a drawn-out process that may take years to complete.  However, the 
existing regulatory structure is incapable of providing the type of oversight 
and supervision that is required of modern financial markets and the 
enterprises involved therein.  Consequently, new policies are an inevitable 
and indispensable feature of stable financial growth, new investor 
confidence, and economic recovery in general. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The story of Bear Stearns is in many ways a microcosm for the larger 
economic calamity that began in late 2007 and continues to this day.  As 
Wall Street’s fifth largest investment bank, Bear used aggressive tactics 
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rooted in unchecked speculation to acquire and sell exotic financial 
products whose value was uncertain and largely dependent on the 
continued success of the housing market.  In the absence of strict oversight, 
Bear sold complex derivative investments that pushed the firm’s debt 
beyond the point backed by readily available liquid assets.  Then, when the 
housing bubble burst, Bear’s infrastructure collapsed under the weight of 
its irresponsible balance sheet, bringing the securities firm to the brink of 
bankruptcy. 
Constrained by antiquated laws providing only a limited number of 
options to choose from, the Central Bank intervened to prevent Bear 
Stearns’s disorderly failure, fearing that the firm’s downfall would touch 
off an uncontrollable domino effect among similar institutions.  In doing 
so, the Fed committed billions of dollars of taxpayer money in an effort to 
prevent a larger disaster, the implications of which could not be fully 
predicted.  Such actions raised important questions regarding the legality 
of the Fed’s brokerage of the sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan, especially 
the risk posed to commercial depositors that had been a focus of federal 
laws aimed at precluding similar transactions.  And despite the bailout, 
investment banks continued to fail, while others drastically changed their 
business structures to survive the loss of investor confidence that continues 
to shake the foundation of Wall Street itself. 
Now, in the aftermath of the devastation of America’s investment 
banking industry, the call for regulatory reform has been widespread and 
intense.  As the past two years demonstrate, the federal government must 
be granted broader authority within the financial services industry to 
effectively manage systemic risks in a way that reduces the likelihood of 
future bailouts and reckless market practices.  Still, this reform must also 
preserve the competitiveness of key sectors of the United States economy.  
Given the Fed’s assumed role as steward over much of the existing 
investment banking landscape, it should be given the supervisory powers 
needed to fulfill its newfound responsibilities. 
If one considers the development of the current economic crisis from a 
macro level, the comparisons to be drawn from the Bear Stearns incident 
are apparent.  First, the demise of the housing market and the onset of the 
mortgage crisis precipitated the failure (or near failure) of some of Wall 
Street’s largest institutions.  In turn, these events threatened the vitality of 
the entire economy.  Second, the federal government took unprecedented 
actions to bail out the financial system, injecting up to $700 billion of 
public money into the ailing credit and securities markets.  But the 
economy continued its recessionary fall, with investors fleeing, 
unemployment rising, and growth stagnating.  Finally, in the wake of this 
catastrophe, the Obama administration and Congress have promised 
sweeping regulatory programs designed to combat the failings of existing 
frameworks, while also strengthening economic resilience and progression.  
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In this way, both Bear and the larger crisis have followed the course from 
failure, to bailout, to calls for reform. 
